关键词: 双循环格局, 需求不确定, 信息披露, 贝叶斯博弈

Abstract:

Under the new development pattern of dual circulation and facing the uncertainty of the market， it’s worth discussing whether local manufacturers with comprehensive data have the motivation to disclose information and whether more accurate demand signals are beneficial to all parties in the supply chain. A stylized signal game model under the competitive environment is constructed to study the information disclosure problem in the supply chain system. In the two modes of information encryption and information disclosure， factors affecting the strategy choices of the supply chain members such as product brand image， market demand uncertainty， and investment efficiency are considered to deduce the conditional interval for achieving the Pareto optimality of the supply chain. The results show that encrypting company information to maintain the information security of the supply chain may not be the best choice for local manufacturers. When the investment cost is higher than a certain threshold， local manufacturers will voluntarily abandon the information encryption strategy and turn to the disclosure strategy， while the multinational manufacturers always favor the information disclosure strategy. Meanwhile， there is a win-win interval for domestic and foreign supply chain members， which are specifically divided into “win-win under a high-quality image” and “win-win under a poor-quality image”. Interestingly， the size of the win-win interval is affected by the market demand uncertainty， noise deviations that interfere with market forecasts， and foreign wholesale prices. Therefore， companies should pay close attention to market fluctuations and their own brand image before making strategic choices.

Key words: dual circulation pattern, uncertain demand, information disclosure, bayesian game