关键词: IPO；信息披露；发行人；保荐人；监管者；媒体曝光

Abstract: Under registration system, information disclosure is the core of IPO. Full and timely information disclosure is the core of IPO valuation. A three-party evolutionary game model is constructed including issuer, sponsor and regulator, the strategy selection and game equilibrium of each participant in the IPO information disclosure process is studied, and a simulation analysis is conducted. The results show that if the incentives for regulators are sufficient or the penalties for issuers and sponsors are severe enough, issuers will choose to disclose the information truthfully. Media exposure significantly affects the game equilibrium and can improve the quality of IPO information disclosure. Therefore, establishing sufficient and effective reward and punishment mechanism is the fundamental policy to improve the quality of IPO information disclosure. In short, IPO information disclosure quality is jointly determined by issuers, sponsors and regulators, and is significantly affected by media exposure probability. As long as an effective and sufficient incentive and punishment mechanism is established, the problem of IPO false information disclosure that has long plagued the development of China's capital market can be solved. In the short term, strengthening the supervision of issuers is the most direct measure to improve the quality of IPO information disclosure. However, in the long run, the solution is to build up effective and adequate reward and punishment mechanisms by pooling the efforts of regulators, social supervision forces represented by the media, investors and judicial institutions.

Key words: IPO; information disclosure; issuer; sponsor; regulator; media exposure