网络外部性下考虑用户归属情形的社区团购平台定价策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1444

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文以社区团购为背景，综合考虑网络外部性及用户归属情形，构建一个社区团购双寡头竞争市场双边平台博弈模型，并对社区团购平台的定价策略、市场份额以及平台利润进行深入探讨和分析。研究结果表明：当用户为单归属时，不论双边用户偏好及网络外部性如何变动，两个社区团购平台都会平分单归属方市场。用户的平台偏好越强，就越倾向于单归属，网络外部性越强，就越倾向于多归属；不同归属情形下，社区团购平台对消费者的定价会受到用户偏好以及网络外部性影响，当消费者偏好超过某个阈值时，平台会对其进行收费以提高利润，反之，则进行补贴以吸引流量；在只考虑消费者同边网络外部性以及供应商交叉网络外部性前提下，社区团购平台对供应商始终采取收费策略，当部分供应商由单归属转为多归属时，其市场影响力提高，供应商的偏好强度不仅对自身定价产生影响，同时也影响平台对消费者的定价以及平台利润。

关键词: 社区团购, 双边市场, 平台竞争, 网络外部性, 部分多归属

Abstract:

With the development of e-commerce and the prosperity of platform economy， the traditional retailing industry has suffered a huge impact， and the competition among various industries has become increasingly intensified. As a new retailing model， community group buying has received widespread attention from the society. The outbreak and continuation of COVID-19 makes community group buying one of the most popular O2O shopping patterns. Thus， community group buying is taken as the background， considers the platform network externalities and users' affiliation situation， a two-sided platform game model of community group-buying duopoly competitive market is constructed， and on the in-depth discussion and analysis are carried on to the platform's pricing strategy， market share and platform profit under the competition situation.The main results are as follows：　when users are single-homing， the two competitive platforms will share the single users' markets regardless of the changes of bilateral users' preferences and network externalities. The stronger the user's platform preference is， the more inclined to single-homing， and the stronger the network externality is， the more inclined to multi-homing. In different attribution situations， the platform's pricing for consumers will be affected by users' preferences and network externalities. When consumer' preferences exceed a certain threshold， the platform will charge them to increase profits， and otherwise subsidize them to market flow. Under the premise of only considering the consumers' same-side externality and suppliers' cross-side externality， the community group buying platform always adopts a charging strategy for suppliers. When partial suppliers change from single-homing to multi-homing， their market influence increases. Suppliers' preferences will not only affect their own pricing， but also affect the platform's pricing to consumers and platform' profits.

Key words: community group buying, two-sided market, platform competition, network externality, partial multi-homing

中图分类号:

F272

郑静, 王勇, 陈悦, 宋一民. 网络外部性下考虑用户归属情形的社区团购平台定价策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(7): 305-315.

Jing Zheng, Yong Wang, Yue Chen, Yimin Song. Research on the Pricing Strategy of Community Group Buying Platform Considering Users’Affiliation Situation under Network Externality[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(7): 305-315.

图/表 7

图1

表1

符号说明"

符号	含义描述
$c$	消费者
$s$	供应商
$t c$ / $t s$	消费者/供应商的运输成本
$e c$ / $e s$	消费者/供应商加入平台的基本效用
$m 1$ / $m 2$	消费者加入平台1/平台2产生的费用
$f 1$ / $f 2$	供应商加入平台1/平台2产生的费用
$α c$ / $α s$	消费者/供应商的同边网络外部性
$β c$ / $β s$	消费者/供应商的交叉网络外部性

表1

图2

图3

图4

图5

表2

社区团购四种归属情形均衡结果对比"

参数	S-S情形	M-S情形	S-M情形	M-M情形
$m 1$	$B - β s$	$2 α c B - β s A 2 E$	$B - β s 2 4 t s$	$α c (2 t s A B - t c β s 2) 2 t s A E + α c β s 2$
$f$	$t s$	$t s$	$β s 4$	$t s β s F 2 t s A E + α c β s 2$
$n c 1$	$12$	$4 t c 2 - 2 α c 2 - β s A 2 A E$	$12$	$2 t s F 2 t s A E + α c β s 2$
$n c 0$	/	$- 2 t c 2 + (α c + β s) A 2 A E$	/	$1 - 4 t s F 2 t s A E + α c β s 2$
$n s 1$	$12$	$12$	$1 - β s 4 t s$	$- 1 - β s F 2 t s A E + α c β s 2$
$n s 0$	/	/	$- 1 + β s 2 t s$	$- 1 + 2 β s F 2 t s A E + α c β s 2$
$π 1$	$12 (B + t s - β s)$	$8 t c 3 t s + 2 t c α c 2 (2 t c - 3 t s) + 2 α c 2 β s A + β s 2 A 2 4 A E 2$	$116 (8 B - β s 2 t s)$	$(t s α c 2 + t c β s 2) (4 t c t s A B - α c 2 β s 2) (2 t s A E + α c β s 2) 2$
限制条件	$t c > α c$ $4 t s B > β s 2$	$t c > α c$ $4 t s B > β s 2$ $2 t c 2 < (α c + β s) A < 4 t c 2 + α c B$	$t c > α c$ $8 t s B > β s 2$ $β s 4 < t s < β s 2$	$t c > α c$ , $4 t c t s A B > α c 2 β s 2$ $2 t s (2 t c + α c) B < α c β s 2$ $β s F - α c β s 2 2 A E < t s < 2 β s F - α c β s 2 2 A E$

表2

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