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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 65-76.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1245

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

竞争环境下双边平台增值服务质量投资竞争研究

桂云苗1,2, 武众1, 龚本刚1   

  1. 1. 安徽工程大学经济与管理学院, 安徽 芜湖 241000;
    2. 中国科学技术大学管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230026
  • 收稿日期:2018-09-04 修回日期:2019-01-03 出版日期:2021-05-20 发布日期:2021-05-26
  • 通讯作者: 桂云苗(1978-),男(汉族),安徽潜山人,安徽工程大学经济与管理学院,教授,博士,研究方向:平台运营管理,E-mail:ymgui@ahpu.edu.cn. E-mail:ymgui@ahpu.edu.cn.
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71671001）；安徽省自然科学基金资助项目（2008085MG229）

Value-added Service Quality Investment Competition Decision of Bilateral Platform in Competitive Environment

GUI Yun-miao1,2, WU Zhong1, GONG Ben-gang1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, China;
    2. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
  • Received:2018-09-04 Revised:2019-01-03 Online:2021-05-20 Published:2021-05-26

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摘要： 为了提高竞争环境下双边平台效益与竞争优势，讨论了平台企业对双边用户增值服务质量投资竞争决策问题。在考虑三种不同用户归属条件的基础上，构建了双边平台增值服务投资竞争模型。通过比较分析发现：当双边用户单归属时，无论对平台单边还是双边进行增值服务投资，投资高质量增值服务均是两平台的占优策略。当单边用户多归属时，若对消费者边进行增值服务投资，则投资低质量增值服务为平台的占优策略；若对供应商边或双边进行增值服务投资，则投资高质量增值服务为平台的占优策略。当双边用户多归属时，无论对平台单边还是双边进行增值服务投资，投资低质量增值服务均是两平台的占优策略。

关键词: 双边市场, 平台竞争, 增值服务质量, Hotelling模型

Abstract: A two-sided platform is defined as intermediaries to connect buyers and sellers, such as Alipay, JD mall. Platform economy has become an important part of Chinese new era. With the intensification of competition among platform enterprises, the subsidy strategy can no longer be a useful means for platform to expand basic users and improve users' loyalty. Platform invested value-added services, which can improve the value and experience of the platform. Therefore, it has become a key issue to choose value-added services for bilateral platforms in a competitive environment.
Based on the Hotelling model, the influence of investment on network externality, investment cost, profit and users' utilities is explored. Considering three different user-homing conditions, the two-sided game model is developed. Through comparative analysis, it is found that when the two-sided users are single-homing, whether the platform one-sided or two-sided value-added service quality investment is performed, high quality investment is the dominant strategy of the two platforms. When only one-sided users is multi-homing, if value-added services investments on consumers side are performed, low quality investment is the dominant strategy of the two platforms; if value-added service investments on suppliers side or two-sided are performed, high quality investment is the dominant strategy of the two platforms. When two-sided users are multi-homing, whether one-sided or two-sided value-added service quality investment is performed, low quality investment is the dominant strategy of the two platforms.
The results have some practical implications for two-sided platforms' investment strategies. Firstly, more attention should be paid to improve users' experiences and avoid subsidy war. Secondly, investing value-added services should become the most important way to improve customers' loyalty. Finally, making use of bilateral market characteristics of platform investment, it can reduce barriers to entry the right users' side to promote competitive advantage.

Key words: two-sided market, platform competition, value-added service quality, Hotelling model

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