渠道投机行为容忍对经济绩效的“双刃剑”效应：法律和道德规范要素的权变作用

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0144

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

企业治理渠道投机行为的核心目标是降低交易成本，提高渠道经济绩效。然而，在渠道管理实践中，企业在实施治理之外，更广泛地存在对投机行为的容忍，而其会对渠道经济绩效产生何种影响还有待于深入探究。本文基于社会交换理论，回答了制造商容忍投机行为会如何影响经济绩效，以及上述影响在法律和道德规范要素的情境作用下会发生何种变化的问题。通过搜集一手配对数据和二手数据进行实证检验，研究发现，制造商容忍投机行为对其经济绩效的影响存在“双刃剑”效应，并表现为U型关系。在制造商的契约执行更严格时，以及其所处地区法律执行有效性更完备时，该关系曲线会变得扁平；而在制造商信任水平更高时，该关系曲线会更加陡峭。本文为企业在实践中客观认识和理性使用容忍的权宜性策略，以及采取措施避免其在使用时陷入“居中不良”陷阱提供了借鉴。

关键词: 投机行为容忍, 经济绩效, 法律规范要素, 道德规范要素, 社会交换理论

Abstract:

In the context of marketing channels， the governance of opportunistic behaviour by enterprises is not solely aimed at establishing a transaction order； it is also intended to achieve economic performance. However， transaction cost theory posits that opportunism is an inherent tendency of economic entities. Consequently， the governance of opportunistic behaviour by enterprises also gives rise to costs associated with the design and implementation of governance mechanisms. It is therefore evident that the complete eradication of opportunistic behaviour through the implementation of governance is not a viable solution. In practice， however， channel enterprises frequently demonstrate a willingness to tolerate opportunistic behaviour. When faced with such behaviour from partner enterprises， they tend to maintain existing relationships， refrain from immediate intervention， and hope that the problem can be resolved independently. Nevertheless， existing literature has primarily focused on the negative consequences of enterprise tolerance on further opportunistic behaviour by partner enterprises， as well as the positive consequences of enterprise-led restoration of trust under certain conditions. There is a notable absence of research on the economic performance of channels.It is posited that the tolerance of opportunistic behaviour represents a expedient strategy for enterprises. It is based on social exchange theory and seeks to answer the research question of “how manufacturers' tolerance of opportunistic behaviour affects economic performance， and how these impacts will change in the context of legal and moral normative elements”. A mixed-methods approach is employed， combining first-hand paired data with second-hand data for empirical testing. This revealed a double-edged effect of manufacturers' tolerance of opportunistic behaviour on its economic performance， manifested as a U-shaped relationship. When the enforcement of contracts by manufacturers is more rigorous and the legal enforcement effectiveness of the region in which the manufacturer is located is more comprehensive， this relationship will become less pronounced. Conversely， when manufacturers have greater trust in their partner enterprises， this relationship will become more pronounced. A theoretical rationale is offered for the tolerance of opportunistic behaviour as a pervasive expedient strategy in channel management practice. Furthermore， it contributes to the existing research literature on response strategies and governance of opportunistic behaviour in channels. It also contributes to the existing body of research on the influence of institutional environmental factors on the variability of channel governance outcomes.

Key words: the tolerance of opportunistic behavior, economic performance, legal norm elements, moral norm elements, social exchange theory

中图分类号:

D90-052

张闯, 窦志慧, 赫勇. 渠道投机行为容忍对经济绩效的“双刃剑”效应：法律和道德规范要素的权变作用[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(7): 294-304.

Chuang Zhang, Zhihui Dou, Yong He. The Double-edged Effect of the Tolerance of Channel Opportunism on Economic Performance: The Contingent Role of the Elements of Legal and Moral Norms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(7): 294-304.

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