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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 288-298.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1687

• • 上一篇    

新版“限塑令”下基于社会共治的塑料污染源头治理问题研究

王丹丹1,菅利荣1(),付帅帅2   

  1. 1.南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏 南京 211106
    2.东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏 南京 211189
  • 收稿日期:2020-09-02 修回日期:2021-01-05 出版日期:2024-01-25 发布日期:2024-02-08
  • 通讯作者: 菅利荣 E-mail:lr_jian@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71573124);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2019SJZDA036);江苏省社会科学基金项目(18EYB015)

The Source Governance of Plastic Pollution Based on Social Co-governance under the New Version ofPlastic Restriction Order

Dandan Wang1,Lirong Jian1(),Shuaishuai Fu2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
    2.School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2020-09-02 Revised:2021-01-05 Online:2024-01-25 Published:2024-02-08
  • Contact: Lirong Jian E-mail:lr_jian@163.com

摘要:

塑料污染源头治理问题是新版“限塑令”在政策落实的过程中面临的关键问题。基于社会共治理念,考虑政府、社会公众、塑料生产企业对塑料污染源头治理的影响,建立基于政府监管、企业转型生产、公众参与监督的演化博弈模型,探讨了不同情境下各参与方在塑料污染源头治理问题的演化均衡策略,并借助数值仿真分析各主体在塑料污染源头共同治理过程中的决策行为。研究结果表明,在新版“限塑令”实施后,受政府监管及社会公众监督的影响,不论从短期效果或长期效果来看,均会促使企业选择转型生产策略,有助于从源头切断塑料污染;较大的政府监管力度可有效约束企业违规生产行为,而当政府消极监管时,公众的监督举报可对企业生产行为进行有效约束;若政府提高对公众参与监督的经济激励,有助于提升公众参与塑料污染源头问题的社会共治水平。

关键词: 塑料污染, 源头治理, 社会共治, 演化博弈

Abstract:

The plastic pollution source treatment is a key issue in the policy implementation of the new version of the “plastic limit order”. An evolutionary game model based on government supervision, enterprise transformation production, and public participation in supervision is established in the perspective of social co-governance, in which the impact of the government, the public, and plastic manufacturers on the governance of plastic pollution sources is considered. This model analyzes the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of pollution source treatment problems under four different scenarios. In addition, the numerical simulation is utilized to analyze the decision-making behaviors of various entities in the process of collective treatment of plastic pollution sources. According to the analysis results, some interesting conclusions can be obtained, which are shown as follows: (1) Regardless of the effect of long-term or short-term, the implementation of the new version of the "plastic restriction order” can prompt companies to choose transformation production strategies with the influence of government supervision and public supervision. It also can cut plastic pollution from the source. (2) Higher levels of government regulation can effectively restrain the illegal production behavior of enterprises. On the other hand, the public supervision can effectively restrain the production behavior of enterprises when the government has a negative regulation. (3) Increasing the economic incentives for citizen’s supervision is helpful for improving citizen’s social co-governance level in plastic pollution source treatment process.

Key words: plastic pollution, source governance, social co-governance, evolutionary game

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