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中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (3): 143-154.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0951

• 论文 • 上一篇    

直播带货平台生态体系价值共毁的演化博弈

刘建刚, 吴倩, 张美娟   

  1. 常州大学商学院,江苏 常州213000
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-02 修回日期:2022-08-12 发布日期:2023-04-03
  • 通讯作者: 刘建刚(1977-),男(汉族),河南西平人,常州大学商学院,教授,博士,研究方向:平台治理,Email:ujs_liu@cczu.edu.cn. E-mail:ujs_liu@cczu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BGL096);江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(19GLB015);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX21_2774);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2018SJZDI045)

Evolutionary Game of Value Co-Destruction of the Ecosystem of Live Commerce Platform

LIU Jian-gang, WU Qian, ZHANG Mei-juan   

  1. Business School, Changzhou University, Changzhou 213000, China
  • Received:2022-05-02 Revised:2022-08-12 Published:2023-04-03
  • Contact: 刘建刚 E-mail:ujs_liu@cczu.edu.cn

摘要: 直播带货作为新兴的电商形式,正迅猛发展,然而平台、主播和买家三方主体的资源滥用和流程对接失调往往会引发直播带货平台生态体系的价值共毁风险。为剖析直播带货平台生态体系中各主体行为策略对引发价值共毁风险的影响,构建了“平台-主播-买家”价值共毁演化博弈模型;建立了支付矩阵对各主体的互动行为以及稳定状态进行分析,同时运用数值仿真验证稳定结果的正确性;通过调整惩罚力度、激励力度、网络外部性收益分配系数三个参数的取值,研究了三个参数调整对演化结果的影响。结果表明:惩罚力度和激励力度的大小能够影响价值共毁的产生,但是惩罚力度过大时直播带货生态体系的治理效果不强,激励力度过大时平台和主播会出现行为震荡的现象,价值共毁概率增加;收益分配系数的提升对直播带货平台生态体系价值共毁风险的抑制有积极作用;直播带货平台策略选择对主播和买家的行为有着引导作用,因此直播带货平台自身需要建立责任机制,领导商业生态圈内各主体的价值共毁治理。

关键词: 直播带货平台;价值共毁;演化博弈

Abstract: As an emerging form of e-commerce, live commerce is developing rapidly. However, there is a common phenomenon of value co-destruction on live commerce platform, which is manifested in differences of objectives among the platform, anchor and buyer, as well as abuse of resources. In order to analyze the influence of the behavior strategies of each subject in the live commerce platform ecosystem on the risk of value co destruction, an evolutionary game model of “platform anchor buyer” value co-destruction is constructed. The payment matrix is established to analyze the interaction behavior and stable state. Numerical simulation is used to verify the correctness of the stable results, and the values of punishment, incentive and network externality income distribution coefficient are adjusted to study their impact on the evolution results. The results show that: the degree of punishment and incentive can affect the phenomenon of co-destruction of value. The greater the punishment degree is, the weaker the governance effect will be. When the incentive degree is too large, the platform and anchors will have behavior shock, and the probability of co-destruction of value will increase; the increase of revenue distribution coefficient plays a positive role in restraining the co-destruction of platform value. In the process of game, the strategic choice of live commerce platform plays a guiding role in the behavior of anchors and buyers. Therefore, live commerce platform needs to establish a responsibility mechanism to lead the governance of value co-destruction of all subjects.

Key words: live commerce platform; value co-destruction; evolutionary game theory

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