技术垄断条件下关键核心技术合作创新的演化稳定策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0474

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 合作创新是突破关键核心技术受制于人的有效途径。为此，根据技术需求企业投资、研发主体努力和技术垄断者提价与否的行为选择，构建三方演化博弈模型，分析了技术垄断条件下合作创新行为的演化规律及外部融资模式的异质性影响机制。研究结果表明：技术外购成本和研发成功收益对企业投资合作创新意愿具有门槛效应；研发成功的预期增收对研发主体策略的影响呈现倒U型；技术自有会打破技术垄断者提价策略的演化稳定。当企业自有资金不足时，债权融资会减缓形成积极合作创新演化稳定策略，股权融资在让利条件下能促进形成积极合作创新演化稳定策略；仅股权融资能抑制形成消极合作创新演化稳定策略。

关键词: 技术垄断；合作创新；三方演化博弈；外部融资

Abstract: Since the outbreak of Sino-U.S. trade friction, the U.S. has imposed a technical blockade on China at a certain technological level. Huawei's sanction incident shows that under the background of internationalization of the high-tech product supply chain when the key part of core technology is monopolized by external suppliers, enterprises are inevitably controlled by foreign suppliers. For long-term development, enterprises must break through the external monopoly of the key part of core technology, and cooperation between enterprises and universities and research institutes is effective. In view of the phenomenon that enterprises are at risk of price control when the key part of core technology can be imported from abroad, a mixed strategy evolutionary game matrix of enterprises, R&D entities, and foreign suppliers is constructed, in which enterprises need to make decisions on whether to invest in R&D entities and lead the creation of innovation consortia. The main strategy of R&D is to strive for R&D or not. The strategy space of foreign suppliers is to increase the product price or not increase the product price, and the influencing factors of tripartite strategy choice are analyzed. As the breakthrough of the key part of core technology is faced with financial difficulties such as high R&D investment, long investment cycle, and high sunk cost, external financing may be needed. The influence of different external financing modes on the evolutionary stability strategy is further analyzed.

Key words: technology monopoly; cooperative innovation; tripartite evolutionary game; external financing

中图分类号:

晏文隽, 王小雪, 李德鸿, 郭菊娥. 技术垄断条件下关键核心技术合作创新的演化稳定策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(7): 227-236.

YAN Wen-jun, WANG Xiao-xue, LI De-hong, Guo Ju-e. Research on Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Cooperative Innovation of Key Part of Core Technology under the Monopoly Condition[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(7): 227-236.

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