政企农协同治理农业面源污染的演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1319

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为破解农业面源污染治理困境，探索政企农协同治理模式，本文构建地方政府、农业企业、农户的三方演化博弈模型，研究地方政府通过经济激励或行政处罚作用于农业企业，农业企业借助产业链主导优势，通过农产品分级收购和绿色溢价返还等方式倒逼农户绿色生产的内在机理，以及协同治理成为演化稳定均衡的条件。研究表明：①适度的经济激励既能保证地方政府环境规制的持续推进，又有利于激发农企的主导治理行为；②降低农企的主导治理成本、提高农企对主导治理带来的长期环境收益的重视度有利于农企积极主导；③绿色溢价最优返还比例存在某临界值，只有当返还比例大于该临界值时，农户才倾向于绿色生产，且没有农企主导时需要给予农户更高的绿色溢价返还比例，才能激励农户绿色生产；④三方博弈主体的成本收益比满足一定条件时，系统将演化稳定于理想的均衡状态(1，1，1)。通过对政企农三方协同机理分析，为构建农业面源污染多元共管共治新模式提供理论依据和政策支持。

关键词: 农业面源污染；政企农协同；演化博弈

Abstract: Rural non-point source pollution governance is an important element of ecological environmental protection，which is related to the construction of rural ecological civilization，national food security and agricultural green development，and the water tank，rice bag and vegetable basket of urban and rural residents．In order to solve the pollution problem of rural non-point source，explore the co-governance mode of multi-subject participation consisting of government，agribusinesses and farmers，evolutionary game model of local government，agribusinesses and farmers is built，the dominant advantage of local government in forcing farmers is explored to “reduce the amount at source” by taking advantage of the leading role of agribusinesses in the industrial chain to link up with the market and farmers．Specifically，local governments act on agribusinesses through administrative orders and financial subsides to supervise and support the development of agribusinesses and gain policy benefits from the central government. Agribusinesses，as government agents，supervise the green production behavior of farmers，after supervising and testing the quality of agricultural products，adopt a graded purchase system or give farmers green premium dividends to take care of farmers，thus driving farmers to provide high-quality green products according to the contract signed between the two parties．At the same time，agricultural enterprises also realize the green supply chain revenue．

Key words: agricultural non-point source pollution; government-agricultural enterprise-farmer collaboration; evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F203.9

何奇龙, 唐娟红, 罗兴, 王先甲. 政企农协同治理农业面源污染的演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(7): 202-213.

HE Qi-long, TANG Juan-hong, LUO Xing, WANG Xian-jia. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Agricultural Non-point Source Pollution Coordinated Governance by Government，Agricultural Enterprise and Farmers[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(7): 202-213.

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