数据优势会使平台企业提高定价吗？——模型推导与理论分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0819

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 数字经济时代，数据成为平台企业的重要生产要素。本文分析了垄断环境与差异化竞争环境下，数据对平台企业定价行为的影响。研究结果表明：在垄断环境下，数据会降低平台企业产品或服务的价格；差异化竞争环境下，数据的丰富使市场中的平台企业可以自发地形成两种定价方式：对于为主流领域提供产品或服务的企业而言，数据会使其提高价格获取利润，而对于面临长尾需求的企业而言，数据会使其降低价格，采取"薄利多销"的手段获取利润。同时，本文也提出了对数据优势作用的进一步思考——数据有助于完全价格歧视的实现与产生新价格歧视场景；数据有助于企业识别自身特征，进一步使平台市场自发形成"主流层次"与"长尾层次"两个层次；数据有弱化市场势力的作用。

关键词: 数据优势, 平台企业, 定价行为, 垄断, 差异化竞争

Abstract: In the era of digital economy, data has become an important production factor of platform enterprises, which has profoundly affected the market behavior of platform companies including pricing behavior.Whether the accumulation of data will generate a "data monopoly" phenomenon and promote the price increase of platform enterprises has become an important practical and academic issue.In view of this, from the theoretical point of view, whether the data advantage will cause the company to raise prices under the monopolistic and differentiated competition scenarios is analyzed.In the analysis of the monopoly scenario, based on the two-sidedmarket model proposed by Armstrong in 2006, the parameters reflecting the data accumulation are constructed and the optimal pricing function is solved, then how the data affects the pricing of monopoly platform enterprises is clarified. In the analysis of differentiated competition scenarios, the concept of "preference cost" is introduced and the Hotelling model is improved to derive the effect of data on the pricing of different types of platform enterprises.The main research results show that:(1) Compared with traditional monopolistic platform enterprises, monopolistic platform enterprises with data advantages will reduce the price of their products or services;(2) Under the conditions of differentiated competition, the enterprises which to meet users' marginalization or relatively low-level demand, data accumulation will reduce pricing, while for enterprises offering mainstream or relatively high-level products or services, data accumulation will increase pricing;(3)For a marginalized or low-end market Demand increases with the increase of data; for a mainstream or higher-end market, demand decreases with the increase of data; (4)In a differentiated competitive environment, data accumulation helps to improve platform enterprise profits.Further, this paper discusses the relationship between data advantage and price discrimination, long tail effect, and monopoly characteristics.First of all, the data advantage helps the monopolistic enterprise to achieve complete price discrimination and the new price discrimination scenarios may emergence.Secondly, the data helps enterprises identify their own characteristics, and further makes the platform market divided into "mainstream level" and "long tail level".At last, the data has the effect of weakening the market power and can reflect a more positive welfare effect.On the other hand, it it also proposed that there are hidden concerns about data diversification and transaction behavior of enterprises. Diversified data helps enterprises to grasp user preferences more accurately, and implement more covert and extensive price discrimination to occupy consumer surplus.

Key words: data advantage, platform enterprise, pricing behavior, monopoly, differentiated competition

中图分类号:

F270

荆文君. 数据优势会使平台企业提高定价吗？——模型推导与理论分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(7): 227-237.

JING Wen-jun. Will Data Advantages Increase Platform Companies' Pricing?——Model Derivation and Theoretical Analysis[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(7): 227-237.

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