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中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (10): 96-106.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1634

• 论文 • 上一篇    

公平偏好下制造商主导型供应链风险传递研究

王军进,刘家国,徐文力   

  1. 大连海事大学航运经济与管理学院,辽宁 大连116026
  • 收稿日期:2018-11-15 修回日期:2019-04-23 出版日期:2021-10-20 发布日期:2021-10-21
  • 通讯作者: 刘家国(1979—),男(汉族),湖北枣阳人,大连海事大学航运经济与管理学院,教授,博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理,Email:liujiaguo@gmail.com. E-mail:liujiaguo@gmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71774019,71402038);教育部人文社科后期项目(19JHQ096);辽宁省兴辽英才项目(XLYC1807097);辽宁自然基金行业联合基金资助项目(2020-HYLH-30);中央高校基本科研业务费(3132021506)

Research on Risk Transmission of Manufacturer-led Supply Chain Under Fairness Preference

WANG Junjin, LIUJiaguo, XU Wenli   

  1. School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China
  • Received:2018-11-15 Revised:2019-04-23 Online:2021-10-20 Published:2021-10-21

摘要: 为研究公平偏好对供应链风险传递的影响,引入公平偏好效用函数,构建制造商主导型供应链风险传递模型,并借助价格弹性系数引申出风险弹性系数,再利用公平偏好矩阵,解决由生产成本波动引起定价与收益风险传递问题。研究表明:制造商公平偏好对定价风险有正向效用,零售商独具公平偏好只对批发价格风险起负向效用却不影响销售价格风险,但制造商公平偏好能促进零售商公平偏好降低销售价格风险;市场规模会弱化公平偏好对定价风险的效用,而价格敏感性则强化该效用;对于收益风险传递提出并证明了一般性结论:收益风险传递与公平偏好无关,只与外部市场有关。数值仿真表明零售商需理性把握公平偏好度以便控制定价风险,而制造商则需要更多地关注公平性,以便于减小定价风险。研究结果对理性权衡收益与风险具有一定的参考价值,对非理性特征下供应链风险管理的良性发展有重要的指导意义。

关键词: 公平偏好, 弹性系数, 风险传递, 制造商主导, 供应链风险

Abstract: In order to research the impact of fairness preference on supply chain risk transmission, the fairness preference utility function is introduced to construct a risk transmission model in a manufacturer-led supply chain. And the risk elasticity coefficient is obtained by the analogy of the price elasticity coefficient, and then the fairness preference matrix is used to solve the problem of pricing and revenue risk transmitting caused by the variation of production cost.The research shows that the manufacturer’sfairness preference has a positive effect on the risk of both wholesale price and sales price. When retailer has its fairness preference alone, it will only has a negative effect on wholesale price risk. When both the members have the fairness preferences respectively, manufacturer’sfairness preference will stimulate the retailer’sfairness preference to reduce the sales price risk. Market size will weaken the influence of fairness preference on pricing risk, while it will be strengthened by the price sensitivity.A general conclusion is proposed and demonstrated for the revenue risk transmitting: The revenue risk transmitting has nothing to do with fairness preference but is only related with the external market.Numerical simulation shows that retailers need to rationally grasp the degree of fairness preference to control pricing risk, while manufacturers need to pay more attention to fairness to reduce pricing risk. The results give a certain reference to the rational balance of revenue and risk, and have important guiding significance for the benign development of supply chain risk management under the irrational characteristics.

Key words: fairness preference, elasticity coefficient, risk transmission, manufacturer-led, supply chain risk

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