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中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (4): 136-148.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.04.013

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于横向和纵向公平偏好的二层供应链网络均衡决策

郑英杰, 周岩   

  1. 青岛大学管理科学与工程系, 山东 青岛 266071
  • 收稿日期:2018-01-18 修回日期:2018-06-20 出版日期:2019-04-20 发布日期:2019-06-12
  • 通讯作者: 周岩(1979-),女(汉族),山东青岛人,青岛大学管理科学与工程系,副教授,博士,研究方向:供应链管理,E-mail:yanyanz22@hotmail.com. E-mail:yanyanz22@hotmail.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771129,71740011);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2016GM01)

The Equilibrium Decisions of A Two-layer Supply Chain Network Based on Horizontal and Vertical Fairness Preference

ZHENG Ying-jie, ZHOU Yan   

  1. Department of Management Science and Engineering, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
  • Received:2018-01-18 Revised:2018-06-20 Online:2019-04-20 Published:2019-06-12

摘要: 在上层为制造商、下层为多个竞争型零售商和需求市场的二层供应链网络中,分析了多个零售商间横向公平偏好、零售商与制造商间纵向公平偏好行为。构建了下层零售商考虑横向和纵向公平偏好的Nash均衡模型,并且得到上层和下层供应链网络的Stackelberg-Nash博弈模型,利用罚函数法求解得到二层供应链网络均衡决策。定性分析了零售商横向、纵向公平偏好权重和纵向公平参考系数对均衡决策的影响,并通过数值算例验证。最后对供应链各决策者给出应对公平偏好负效用的合理化建议。

关键词: 横向公平偏好, 纵向公平偏好, 均衡决策

Abstract: With the growth of market size and the intensification of market competition, there are many members in the supply chain. With the increase of supply chain members and the diversification of role types, a two-layer supply chain network based on one manufacturer and many retailerscan reflect the practical problem. The equilibrium decisions of a two-layer supply chain network considering retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness preference is studied. The impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness behaviors on the equilibrium decisions of the network is discussed. The Nash game model of the lower tier supply chain and the Stackelberg-Nash game model of the upper tier and lower tier supply chain network are constructed.The equilibrium decisions of all the decision makers are established by the penalty function method.Finally, qualitative analysis of the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference on the equilibrium decisions is carried out. Numerical examples show that the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference weights and their vertical fairness reference coefficient are different to manufacturers and retailers. The conclusions provide some reasonable suggestions to the decision-makers of the supply chain to deal with the negative effects of fair preference behaviors.

Key words: horizontal fairness preference, vertical fairness preference, equilibrium decision

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