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中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (4): 127-135.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.04.012

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于产品质量监管视角的政府、企业与消费者博弈策略研究

刘长玉, 于涛, 马英红   

  1. 山东师范大学商学院, 山东 济南 250014
  • 收稿日期:2017-05-15 修回日期:2017-08-20 出版日期:2019-04-20 发布日期:2019-06-12
  • 通讯作者: 于涛(1956-),男(汉族),山东潍坊人,山东师范大学商学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:产品质量监管,E-mail:yut@sdnu.edu.cn. E-mail:yut@sdnu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(13AGL012);山东省自然基金资助项目(ZR2016GM10,ZR2017 QG003);山东省社会科学规划资助项目(17DG LJ09);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2017M6 22265);山东师范大学青年科技项目培育基金资助

Game of Government, Enterprise and Consumer Based on Product Quality Regulation Perspective

LIU Chang-yu, YU Tao, MA Ying-hong   

  1. School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014, China
  • Received:2017-05-15 Revised:2017-08-20 Online:2019-04-20 Published:2019-06-12

摘要: 鉴于政府、企业与消费者在产品质量监管过程中的重要作用,提出了三方协同监管产品质量的新模式。有别于政府、企业和消费者间的两两博弈,构建了政府、企业和消费者共同参与的产品质量监管博弈模型。通过求解博弈模型的混合战略Nash均衡解,分析了影响三方策略选择的因素,并代入实际数据运用Matlab 7.0对博弈模型进行了算例分析。研究结果表明影响政府监管行为的因素是政府对违规企业的惩罚、企业对消费者损失的赔偿、企业生产合格产品与不合格产品的成本。企业生产合格产品的行为与政府监管成本、企业受到政府惩罚力度、生产不合格产品对政府造成的直接经济损失及间接经济损失因素有关。消费者维权成本及企业对消费者损失的赔偿是影响消费者维权的主要因素。研究得出政府监管企业概率越大,企业生产合格产品的概率越大;消费者维权概率变大时,企业生产合格产品的概率变大,而此时政府监管生产企业的概率变小。最后,从产品质量监管角度,提出了提高政府监管效率、保障企业产品质量、发挥消费者监督优势的建议及措施。

关键词: 产品质量, 协同监管, 三方博弈, 纳什均衡

Abstract: In view of the important role of government, enterprise and consumer in product quality regulation, the new pattern of coordinated regulation is put forward, which can make up the loopholes and improve the efficiency of government regulation. Based on that, the tripartite model of product quality regulation among government, enterprise and consumer is constructed to explore the mixed Nash equilibrium and action strategy. Then, using Matlab 7 analyzes the game model by substituting the actual data.
The results show that the factors that influence the government regulation behavior are the government's punishment to the illegal enterprise, the enterprise's compensation for the loss of the consumer, the cost of the qualified products and unqualified products. The production of qualified products is related to the cost of government regulation, the government's punishment, the direct and indirect economic losses caused by the production of substandard products. Cost of rights protection and compensation for consumers' losses are the main factors that affect consumers' strategic choice. Research also makes clear that the greater the probability of government regulation, the greater the probability of the production of qualified products; when the probability of consumer supervision becomes large, the probability of enterprises to produce qualified products also becomes large, and the probability of government regulation of the enterprise becomes small.
Finally, based on the perspective of government regulation, the measures to deal with the interests of all parties are given, the countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to ensure the quality of the products and to exert the advantages of the consumer supervision.

Key words: product quality, coordinated regulation, tripartite game, Nash equilibrium

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