供应链订货时机协调: 一个风险厌恶的视角

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.08.011

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 就短生命周期产品的订货时机而言，零售商通常偏好延迟订货，而制造商一般鼓励零售商预先订货，制造商和零售商对于订货时机的选择偏好通常是冲突的，对此进行协调可以提高供应链效率。目前，关于供应链订货时机的文献大多假定企业是风险中性的，遵循风险厌恶假设的文献较少。由一个风险厌恶型制造商和风险中性零售商组成的二级供应链中，基于报童模型，探讨了制造商的风险厌恶对供应链订货时机的影响，研究发现多数情况下供应链将处于制造商不利的订货方式，为此设计了回购契约来提供Pareto改善，并分析了回购契约实行的条件。数值分析显示，实行回购契约时，批发价和回购价的设置要兼顾零售商与供应商双方的利益，这样才能满足Pareto改善的条件；另外，供应商的目标利润越小，回购契约越易提供Pareto改善，当目标利润大到一定程度，回购契约不再有效。研究得到了如下创新成果：与风险中性的情形相比较，发现在延迟订货方式下，供应商的最优生产量除了和价格、成本相关外，还与供应商的目标利润密切相关；在柔性订货方式下，供应商的最优生产量并非独立于零售商预订量，而是随预订量递增，且零售商会因供应商的风险厌恶而加大预订量。研究成果对于丰富供应链订货时机文献具有一定价值。

关键词: 风险厌恶, 订货时机, 供应链协调

Abstract: In terms of order timing of short life cycle products, a retailer usually prefers to delayed order.But a manufacturer generally encourages the retailer to order in advance.So there is a conflict in the order timing issue between the manufacturer and the retailer.Coordinating the two sides can improve supply chain's overall performance.The existing papers about order timing of supply chain usually follow the risk-neutral hypothesis. And there are very few papers that conduct research in the case where the member of supply chain is risk-averse. Based on the newsboy model, in a two-echelon supply chain which is comprised of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer, the influence of the manufacturer's risk aversion on the order timing of the supply chain is discussed. It is found that in most case the supply chain may run in a mode which is not preferred by the manufacturer. Then a Buyback contract is designed to provide Pareto improvements. And the situation under which the Buyback contract can work is analyzed. Numerical analysis shows that, the setting of the wholesale price and the buyback price should consider both sides of the interests between the retailer and the manufacturer. In this way, the conditions of Pareto improvement could be meet. In addition, the smaller manufacturer's target profit is, the more easily Buyback contract could provide Pareto improvement. When the target profit gets larger to a certain degree, Buyback contract is no longer valid.The research gets some innovative achievements as follows: under the mode of flexible order, comparing with the risk-neutral situation, the optimal manufacturer's production is not independent of retailer's pre-ordering quantity, but is creasing in it; the retailer's pre-ordering quantity is larger than that of the general case owing to manufacturer's risk aversion. The research results have certain value to enrich literature of supply chain order timing.

Key words: risk aversion, order timing, supply chain coordination

中图分类号:

F224

熊恒庆, 黄勇, 万洁. 供应链订货时机协调: 一个风险厌恶的视角[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(8): 88-97.

XIONG Heng-qing, HUANG Yong, WAN Jie. Coordination of Order Timing in Supply Chain: A Risk Aversion Perspective[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(8): 88-97.

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