Abstract:

As e-commerce and the green transition continue to advance， dual-channel low-carbon supply chains face challenges arising from channel competition， emission-reduction externalities， and insufficient credibility of low-carbon information. This paper constructs a manufacturer-led Stackelberg model. With the carbon emission reduction rate and low-carbon marketing effort exogenously given， it examines the impacts of the sequential introduction of cost-sharing contracts， government subsidies， and blockchain technology on pricing， profit allocation， and social welfare. Furthermore， it extends the analysis to platform-led commission decisions and the performance differences under various power structures. The main findings are as follows： Cost-sharing contracts mainly adjust the distribution of member profits without changing equilibrium prices and social welfare； introducing government subsidies on the basis of contracts can increase wholesale prices， lower offline retail prices， and increase both the profits of supply chain members and social welfare； further introducing blockchain technology can expand market demand by improving the transparency and credibility of low-carbon information， thereby enhancing the synergy between internal contracts and external incentives. However， its net benefit is constrained by unit value-added revenue， variable costs， and fixed costs. In the platform-led scenario， the platform-selected commission rate may exceed the welfare-maximizing level， resulting in an excessively high commission rate. This paper reveals the sequential relationship among internal cost sharing， external policy incentives， and blockchain technology， providing decision-making references for the governance of dual-channel low-carbon supply chains under the digital economy.

Key words: blockchain technology, dual-channel low-carbon supply chain, cost-sharing contract, government subsidy