Abstract:

With the addition of renewable energy to the smart grid， there has been an increasing attention to demand response mechanism based on integrated energy market to guide users to change their electricity consumption behavior actively. Aiming at the integrated energy market with the coupling of traditional energy and a variety of renewable energy， an integrated demand response mechanism which combines price-based demand response with incentive-based demand response is proposed. The mechanism considers the impact of the users' electricity consumption behavior on system decision-making， and subsidizes the retailers to produce renewable energy for promoting renewable energy consumption. Finally， the strategy analysis is carried out by establishing a Stackelberg game model between the retailers and the users. The upper retailers aim to maximize their own profits， and the lower users aim to maximize their own welfares. It is also proved that there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium in the game， and the equilibrium analytical solution is obtained. Numerical analysis verifies the effectiveness of proposed integrated demand response mechanism， and draws the following conclusions： （1） Under the integrated demand response mechanism， the government subsidies to electricity retailers and users' incentives can effectively adjust the peak-valley difference and flexibility of real-time electricity prices containing renewable energy. At the same time， it can also greatly improve the efficiency of renewable energy and reduce carbon emissions； （2） Integrated demand response mechanism can promote the adoption of renewable energy by users； （3） Increasing the incentive rate for users will increase the real-time electricity price and the optimal renewable energy load of users at equilibrium. Finally， the management enlightenment and relevant policy suggestions for the development of integrated demand response mechanism with renewable energy are given： （1） In the actual operation and management of electricity market， it is necessary to pay attention not only to the impact of load transfer and user incentives， but also to the impact of subsidies to the retailers on the supply of renewable energy in the wholesale market， so as to avoid excessive incentives for user demand transfer resulting in the squeeze of profits of the retailers and the reduction of renewable energy supply， and avoid the imbalance between supply and demand in electricity market； （2） The designers of top-level system in electricity market should pay attention to the influence of electricity users' behavior and psychology on policies， consider behavioral factors such as the users' environmental awareness， dissatisfaction， and fairness preference in policy design， and pay attention to reasonably setting relevant environment parameters to cultivate users' environmental awareness； （3） The electricity market should encourage the cultivation of diversified market players， such as encouraging power retailers to purchase renewable energy production equipment， encouraging users to equip distributed energy systems， promoting orderly competition between energy supply and demand， correcting energy imbalances， and improving grid stability. There is still room for further expansion， and the conclusions obtained mainly reflect the impact of expected value of renewable energy output on the real-time pricing mechanism， and paying attention to the intermittent and fluctuating impact of renewable energy generation will be an important topic for further research. In addition， the models and scenarios proposed in this paper are also applicable to other pricing mechanisms in electricity market， and various pricing mechanisms will be analyzed such as time-of-use pricing and key peak pricing in electricity market with renewable energy considering subsidies for power retailers under the integrated demand response mechanism.

Key words: smart grid, integrated demand response, renewable energy, real-time pricing, Stackelberg game