区块链平台不同收费情形下疫苗供应链博弈模型及协调策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0631

Abstract

Abstract:

Blockchain technology can effectively solve the vaccine safety problem. When vaccine supply chain members work with a blockchain platform， there are two main charging ways for the blockchain platform， namely the charging by fixed fee and the charging by service fee. However， current research has not considered the impact of different charging methods on vaccine supply chain operational decisions and coordination strategies. Based on this， the Stackelberg game models of the traditional vaccine supply chain and the blockchain-based vaccine supply chain under different charging scenarios are constructed， the influence of key factors on the optimal decision are analyzed， the conditions for cooperation between the vaccine supply chain and the blockchain platform and the selection of charging methods of the blockchain platform are discussed， and the coordination strategies of blockchain-based vaccine supply chain under different charging scenarios are studies.The results show that reducing the time taken by vaccinators to test vaccines and controlling the number of problematic vaccines can effectively improve the profit of vaccine supply chain. When both the proportion of identified as problematic vaccines and the marginal service cost of the blockchain platform are low， the introduction of the blockchain platform is more beneficial to vaccine supply chain. When the marginal service cost of blockchain platform is high， the charging method by service fee should be selected. Under the charging scenario of fixed fee， when the marginal service cost is equal to a certain value， the vaccine supply chain does not need coordination； when the marginal service cost is below the value， the revenue-sharing and fixed subsidy combined contract can realize the coordination of vaccine supply chain. Whether the vaccine supply chain can achieve coordination under the charging scenario of service fee is related not only to the marginal service cost of the blockchain platform and revenue sharing proportion， but also to the total service fee charged by the blockchain platform to the vaccine manufacturer and the vaccination unit.

Key words: vaccine supply chain, blockchain platform, charging method, Stackelberg game, coordination strategie

CLC Number:

F274

Ruihuan Liu,Chengwei Zhao,Chunqiao Tan. Game Models and Coordination Strategies of Blockchain-based Vaccine Supply Chain under Different Charging Scenarios[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(2): 309-322.

Figures/Tables 12

References 27

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符号	定义
M	疫苗生产商
U	接种单位
BP	区块链平台
w	疫苗生产商的单位批发价格
p	接种单位的单位销售价格
c_M	疫苗生产商边际生产成本
c_U	接种单位的疫苗边际冷藏成本
n	潜在接种者规模
d	疫苗的市场需求量
D	接种单位的疫苗订购量
t	传统疫苗供应链中接种者检验疫苗花费的时间，t>0
T	基于区块链的疫苗供应链中接种者检验疫苗花费的时间，T>0
a	消费者接种到问题疫苗的概率，0≤a<1
η	消费者检验疫苗花费时间对需求的影响系数，η>0
λ	消费者接种到问题疫苗的概率对需求的影响系数，λ>0
θ	基于区块链的疫苗供应链中被认定为问题疫苗的比例，θ>0
F	按固定费用收费
S	按服务费用收费
F₁	区块链平台对疫苗生产商收取的固定费用
F₂	区块链平台对接种单位收取的固定费用
c₁	区块链平台对疫苗生产商的边际服务费用，c₁>0
c₂	区块链平台对接种单位的边际服务费用，c₂>0
Π	利润
NB	传统疫苗供应链模型（未采用区块链技术）
AB	基于区块链的疫苗供应链模型
C	集中式决策
RF	收益共享+固定补贴组合合同
δ₁	组合合同下接种单位收益共享比例
F'	组合合同下接种单位给予区块链平台的固定补贴
RS	收益共享合同
δ₂	收益共享合同下接种单位收益共享比例

Game Models and Coordination Strategies of Blockchain-based Vaccine Supply Chain under Different Charging Scenarios

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