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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (2): 250-262.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1693

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Demand Response Mechanism Design within the Supply Fluctuations of Renewable Energy

Yunrong Zhang1, Zhixiang Chen2, Zhaofu Hong3()   

  1. 1.School of management,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,China
    2.Sun Yat-sen business school,Sun Yat-sen university,Guangzhou 510275,China
    3.School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi’an 710072,China
  • Received:2023-10-13 Revised:2024-07-16 Online:2026-02-25 Published:2026-02-04
  • Contact: Zhaofu Hong E-mail:hongzhf@nwpu.edu.cn

Abstract:

Upgrading energy structure can effectively reduce the carbon emissions of the energy system, which have significantly promoted the integration of renewable energies into the electricity system. With the increasing use of renewable energy in the electricity market generation, the electricity market faces severer supply fluctuation and imbalance challenges. Demand-response programs, such as the price-based program and the incentive-based program, are widely used to induce consumers to change their electricity consumption patterns. However, the existing demand-response program mainly focused on the load management, and has barely considered the impact of renewable energy supply fluctuations. Motivated by these practical challenges, a Stackelberg game model between the electricity system operators and end users is constructed to investigate when the renewable energy integrates into the electricity supply system, how the system operator’s emergency energy control strategy influences the system operator’s demand-response mechanism design decision. The results show that the effect of emergency energy control strategy on the design decision differs for different demand-response programs. For example, under the incentive-based demand-response program, the system operator who does not use the emergency energy will adjust its incentive strategy according to the fixed electricity price in the market; Otherwise, the mechanism design decision of the system operator who implements the price-based program or is willing to use the emergency energy under the incentive-based program, is independent to the fixed electricity price. In addition, the results show that demand-response programs are not always the optimal choice, and there is also no dominant emergency energy control strategy for the two types of demand-response programs. Finally, the two types of demand-response mechanisms are compared with respect to their efficiency in improving the responsiveness of the consumers. The results of this paper can help the system operator to clearly understand the effect of renewable energy supply fluctuations on the electricity market and select a reasonable demand-response mechanism, providing decision support for design of the electricity market trading mechanism.

Key words: energy supply chain, renewable energy, demand-response programs, mechanism design

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