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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 242-252.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1996

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Research on the Scale of Group-buying and Differential Pricing Decisions in Social E-commerce Considering Market Information Value

Chuan Zhao1, Ziyang Guo1, Kun Wang2, Kangyin Dong3()   

  1. 1.School of Business,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China
    2.School of Engineering,Hong Kong Polytechnic University,Hong Kong 999077,China
    3.School of International Business and Economics,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China
  • Received:2023-11-29 Revised:2024-04-25 Online:2026-03-25 Published:2026-03-06
  • Contact: Kangyin Dong E-mail:dongkangyin@uibe.edu.cn

Abstract:

The rise of social e-commerce has benefited from innovative marketing strategies. Among them, group-buying model is a precise marketing strategy that targets consumers with different characteristics. It has combined social attributes and differentiated pricing properties, making it the most effective marketing model today. An optimal decision-making model for merchants and platforms is provided under information asymmetry by comparing uniform pricing models with differential pricing models that provide group buying channels. The model has taken into account consumer heterogeneity and valuable consumer feature information to offer optimal group buying conditions, pricing, and scale. It has also categorized consumers into group-buying preference type and waiting aversion type, analyzing the impact of potential consumer scale, consumer composition, and differences in group formation costs on business decisions. After obtaining precise decision-making on optimal pricing combinations and group-buying scales for each mode, it is found that (1) when the proportion of waiting aversion consumers is slightly higher, providing group-buying options not only does not reduce brand value but also increases both the profits of businesses and platforms. (2) The more pronounced the heterogeneity of consumers, the more profit can be gained from opening group-buying channels. (3) Information on consumer proportions collected by platforms has a more significant impact on large-scale businesses. As the proportion of impatient consumers increases, businesses should widen pricing differentials and set larger group-buying scales.(4) Within a certain range, platforms can obtain additional profits through selling valuable information. However, when businesses have low market forecasting capabilities, choosing to share information with them for free can actually achieve a win-win situation for both the platform and the businesses.

Key words: social e-commerce, group-buying pricing, information value, collaborative decision-making, Stackelberg game

CLC Number: