碳交易机制下考虑零售商信息分享策略的供应链决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1484

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在碳限额与交易机制下，采取常用的历史法作为配额分配方式，针对由制造商、零售商和具有低碳偏好的消费者组成的供应链，考虑市场容量存在不确定性，根据零售商是否向制造商分享预测信息分别构建了两个模型。研究发现：信息分享行为能够促使制造商减少排放量，且预测信息准确度越高，减排效果越明显。当减排成本系数较小时，零售商主动与制造商分享信息；当减排成本系数适中时，可引入信息分享补贴机制，促使零售商进行信息分享；当减排成本系数较大时，零售商始终不分享信息；当减排成本系数低于（高于）阈值时，信息分享行为会提高（降低）消费者剩余的期望值。模型拓展部分考虑了基准线法和历史基准线混合法，发现在历史法分配方式所得的结论依旧适用。

关键词: 碳限额与交易, 信息分享, 配额分配方式, 减排

Abstract:

In recent years， the emission of greenhouse gases has led to the intensification of global warming， which has brought about serious environmental problems. In order to achieve the goal of emission reduction， countries have adopted a series of policies， such as carbon tax， carbon cap-and-trade and so on， among which the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism is widely used because of its obvious effect of emission reduction. Under the carbon cap-and-trade scheme， enterprises can invest in carbon reduction technologies to reduce the carbon emissions in the production process. However， carbon emission reduction will increase the operating costs of enterprises and directly affect the profits of enterprises. Therefore， under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism， how to choose the operational strategy of emission reduction and production of supply chain member enterprises has high research value. In addition， downstream enterprises in the supply chain are closer to the market or the final consumer than upstream enterprises， and thus have more demand information. However， the party with the information advantage， in order to maximize its own interests， often will not share the forecast information， and eventually form the situation of information asymmetry.Therefore， the common historical method is adopted as the quota allocation method under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism. Considering the uncertainty of market capacity in the supply chain composed of manufacturers， retailers and consumers with low carbon preference， two models are constructed respectively according to whether retailers share forecast information with manufacturers. The results show that the information sharing behavior can promote manufacturers to reduce emissions， and the higher the accuracy of prediction information， the more obvious the emission reduction effect； When the emission reduction cost coefficient is small， retailers take the initiative to share information with manufacturers. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is moderate， an information sharing subsidy mechanism can be introduced to encourage retailers to share information. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is large， retailers always do not share information. When the emission reduction cost factor is below （above） the threshold， information sharing behavior will increase （decrease） the expectation of consumer surplus. In the extension part of the model， the combination of datum line method and historical datum line method is considered， and it is found that the conclusions obtained by the historical method are still applicable.Some management insights are offered based on our findings. i） When the emission reduction cost factor is moderate， information sharing will reduce the retailer's own profits. In this case， an information sharing subsidy mechanism should be formed in the supply chain， and the manufacturer should subsidize the retailer's information sharing behavior to achieve mutual benefit and win-win results. ii） Supply chain should be driven by big data technology， improve the accuracy of forecast information， promote information sharing， and help achieve the goal of “double carbon”.

Key words: carbon cap-and-trade, information sharing, quota allocation method, emission reduction

中图分类号:

F274

仝鹏,丁翔,王文宾, 等. 碳交易机制下考虑零售商信息分享策略的供应链决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(4): 287-297.

Peng Tong,Xiang Ding,Wenbin Wang, et al. Research on Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Retailer Information Sharing Strategy under Carbon Trading Mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(4): 287-297.

图/表 9

图1

图2

表1

符号及含义说明"

符号	含义
决策变量
$p$	零售价格，由零售商决策
$w$	批发价格，由制造商决策
$r$	产品减排率，由制造商决策
其他符号
$a 0$	潜在市场容量的确定部分
$t$	零售商预测信息的准确度
$f$	市场潜在容量的预测信息
$A$	掌握预测信息是潜在市场容量的期望值， $E (a \| f) = (1 - t) a 0 + t f = A$
$β$	消费者的低碳偏好系数
$q$	产品的需求量
$C$	碳限额与交易机制下产品的单位成本
$K$	单位碳配额的价格
$E h$	根据历史法制定的配额
$D$	企业的实际排放量
$h$	减排成本系数
$e m$	生产单位产品的排放量
$π$	各成员的利润
$V$	信息分享的价值
下标
$m / r / S C / s$	分别代表制造商/零售商/供应链/碳交易市场

表1

图3

图4

图5

图6

表2

不同配额分配方式下有无信息分享情形下的均衡解"

参数	无信息分享情形	信息分享情形
$w$	$1 4 h - (β + e m K) 2 {- β 2 C (θ) - a 0 e m 2 K 2 + (2 h - β e m K) [a 0 + C (θ)]}$	$1 4 h - (β + e m K) 2 {- β 2 C (θ) - A e m 2 K 2 + (2 h - β e m K) [A + C (θ)]}$
$r$	$[a 0 - C (θ)] (β + e m K) 4 h - (β + e m K) 2$	$[A - C (θ)] (β + e m K) 4 h - (β + e m K) 2$
$p$	$1 2 [4 h - (β + e m K) 2] {2 C (θ) [h - β 2 - β e m K] +$ $+ a 0 (2 h + β 2 - e m 2 K 2) + A [4 h - (β + e m K) 2]}$	$1 4 h - (β + e m K) 2 {- β 2 C (θ) + 3 h A +$ $h C (θ) - β [A + C (θ)] e m K - A e m 2 K 2}$
$q$	$2 h [A - C (θ)] + t (f - a 0) [2 h - (β + e m K) 2] 2 [4 h - (β + e m K) 2]$	$h [A - C (θ)] 4 h - (β + e m K) 2$
$E (π m)$	$h [a 0 - C (θ)] 2 2 [4 h - (β + e m K) 2] + (1 - θ) E h K$	$h {t v + [a 0 - C (θ)] 2} 2 [4 h - (β + e m K) 2] + (1 - θ) E h K$
$E (π r)$	$1 4 [4 h - (β + e m K) 2] 2 {t v [2 h - (β + e m K) 2] 2 +$ $4 h t v (2 h - (β + e m K) 2) + 4 h 2 t v + 4 h 2 [a 0 - C (θ)] 2}$	$h 2 {t v + [a 0 - C (θ)] 2} [4 h - (β + e m K) 2] 2$

表2

表3

零售商信息分享行为的影响"

参数	条件	零售商信息分享行为的影响
$E (π m)$	$h > h 0$	↑
$E (π r)$	$h 0 < h < h 1$	↑
$E (π r)$	$h > h 1$	↓
$E (π s c)$	$h 0 < h < h 2$	↑
$E (π s c)$	$h > h 2$	↓
$E (C S)$	$h 0 < h < h 1$	↑
$E (C S)$	$h > h 1$	↓
$E (S W)$	$h 0 < h < h 2$	↑
$E (S W)$	$h > h 2$	↓

表3

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