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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (4): 330-342.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1358cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1358

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碳排放区域转移视角下政府规制与企业投资

张晗1, 赵骅1(), 李志国2, 蒋莉1   

  1. 1.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆 400044
    2.重庆工商大学管理科学与工程学院,重庆 400067
  • 收稿日期:2024-08-07 修回日期:2024-09-06 出版日期:2026-04-25 发布日期:2026-03-27
  • 通讯作者: 赵骅 E-mail:hua_zhao@cqu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划项目(2022YFB3303600);重庆市技术创新与应用发展重点研发项目(2024TIAD-KPX0154);重庆市自然科学联合创新基金项目(CSTB2023NSCQ-LZX0167);重庆市交通科技计划重点项目(CQJT-CZKJ2023-18)

Carbon Regulation and Firms Investment under the Perspective of Regional Carbon Migration

Han Zhang1, Hua Zhao1(), Zhiguo Li2, Li Jiang1   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China
    2.School of Management Science and Engineering,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China
  • Received:2024-08-07 Revised:2024-09-06 Online:2026-04-25 Published:2026-03-27
  • Contact: Hua Zhao E-mail:hua_zhao@cqu.edu.cn

摘要:

“东数西算”工程引导数字企业向要素成本更低的西部地区布局产能,伴随着碳排放区域转移,可能加剧碳排放总量的增长。为此,政府对西部的新建项目设置了节能减排技术的准入门槛。为了探究政府准入门槛规制对控制碳排放增长的影响,构建包含政府和企业的博弈模型,其中政府对西部新建产能制定减排技术准入门槛;企业选择在东部扩大现有产能并基于高碳排放技术生产;或选择转移至西部新建产能,同时投资改进节能减排技术以达到准入门槛。本文分析了政府的节能减排技术准入门槛对企业产能投资决策和相应生产决策的影响,并讨论了东西区域成本差异和东部碳价波动等因素对政府节能减排准入门槛决策的影响。研究发现,当政府制定的准入门槛较低时,企业选择在西部新建产能,并进行减排技术投资至恰好达到准入门槛。随着政府准入门槛的降低,企业在西部的产能投资规模和产量增加,使得碳排放总量相比在东部扩大现有产能的情形增加更多。政府准入门槛并不总是随东西区域成本差异的扩大而提高,在差异较小时会适当降低准入门槛。此外,准入门槛会随着东部碳价波动加剧而降低,稳定碳价波动更有利于增进社会福利。政府最优准入门槛随着其环境规制力度的加大而提高。在适中的规制强度下,政府最优技术准入门槛能够最大化提高企业在西部新建产能的收益,同时显著降低碳排放总量。

关键词: 政府环境规制, 跨区域产能投资, 减排技术投资

Abstract:

The “East Data West Computing” project, which guides digital firms to deploy production capacity in the western region where factor costs are lower, which is accompanied by a shift in carbon emission areas and may exacerbate the growth of total carbon emissions. To address this issue, the government has set emission-reduction technology thresholds for new projects in the West. In order to investigate the impact of the government's access threshold regulation on controlling the growth of carbon emissions, a game model involving both a government and a firm is constructed. In this model, the government sets emission-reduction technology thresholds for new capacities in the West, while the firm chooses either to expand existing capacity in the East using high-emission technology or to move to the West, investing in improved emission-reduction technology to meet the threshold. The impact of the government’s emission-reduction technology thresholds on the firm’s capacity investment decision and corresponding production decision is analyzed, and how factors such as cost differences between the East and West regions and carbon price fluctuations in the East affect the government’s equilibrium threshold decision is discussed. It is found that when the government sets a lower threshold, the firm opts to build new capacity in the West and invest in emission-reduction technology just enough to meet the threshold. As the government’s threshold is decreased, the firm increases the capacity scale in the West and produce more in this region, resulting in a greater total increase in carbon emissions compared to expanding existing capacity in the East. The government’s threshold does not always increase with the widening cost differences between the regions; it is lowered when the differences are small. Moreover, the government’s threshold decreases as carbon price fluctuations in the East intensify; stabilizing these fluctuations is more beneficial for enhancing social welfare. The government’s optimal threshold increases with the strengthening of its environmental regulations. At a moderate level of regulatory strength, the government’s optimal technological threshold maximizes the benefit of the firm building new capacity in the West, while significantly reducing total carbon emissions.

Key words: government environmental regulation, capacity investment, emission reduction technology investment

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