Due to the characteristics of low value-added and high carbon emission， the OEM industry has been regarded as a special group of China's carbon emission reduction work under the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutrality， especially when the OEMs are restricted by foreign clients and local governments. With the pull and push impacts， how to design the emission reduction strategies and paths for different types of OEMs is an urgent problem to be solved. An evolutionary game model composed of OEMs， foreign clients and local governments is costructed， the complex influencing mechanism of carbon quotas， carbon trading prices， government rewards and punishments， emission reduction technology spillover， technology sharing and corporate reputation on the decision-making of the tripartite gamer is analyzed， the guiding role of precise policies and carbon trading mechanisms in a multi-scenarios emission reduction strategy making situation is explored， and the stability point of the tripartite game system and its evolution process， evolution rate and the motivation of the unstable states are discussed. It is found that： （1） Relying solely either on carbon trading markets or reward and punishment policies poses an impact on emissions reductions within a small range； （2） The difference of reputation loss under the two strategies will reduce the short-sighted behavior and free-riding effect of foreign clients； （3） With the trend toward the medium， the difference of emission reduction and the difference of OEMs’ investment on carbon reduction， the policy range of the government gradually increases； （4） The precise policies of the local pose stronger effects on guiding the emission reduction to a wider range of OEMs and their foreign clients； （5） The increase in the accountability of the foreign clients can not only reduce the risk of financial assistance cheating， but also promote the active emission reduction of OEMs. The best strategy is proposed for the OEM when the local government and foreign client put a pull and push pressure on the OEM’s decision， and a theoretical support and decision basis for the orientation of supply side reform and supply chain reconfiguration is provided.