债权激励对公司再融资的影响研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2498

Abstract

Abstract:

It is a critical way to promote the high-quality development of enterprises by promoting the efficient corporate financing and investment. Facing the refinancing chaos， external supervision is costly and inefficient. It is urgent to find an endogenous mechanism to induce managers make efficient investment and financing decisions spontaneously. In the real world， companies with inside debt （i.e.， pensions and deferred compensation） have fared well during big shocks to the market economy， such as the 2008 financial crisis and COVID-19. However， the existing literature on inside debt mainly focuses on its impact on corporate risk-taking or initial capital structure， and does not use dynamic model to analyze the impact of inside debt on corporate refinancing. Using dynamic programming and stochastic control theory， a continuous-time growth option model is constructed to investigate the impact of inside debt on corporate refinancing. By using the backward recursive method， the risk-neutral value of each stakeholder before and after refinancing， and firm optimal refinancing strategy is calculated. Through theoretical derivation and numerical simulation， we have following three conclusions. Firstly， inside debt can effectively alleviate the distortion of corporate refinancing， improve the rationality of corporate investment， and make up for the lack of refinancing supervision. Secondly， executive compensation structure containing inside debt can send a good signal to the creditors， alleviate the agency conflict between managers and creditors， reduce the company's refinancing cost， and improve the company's refinancing efficiency. Thirdly， inside debt can mitigate the debt overhang problem after refinancing for high leverage firms， but have the opposite effect on low leverage firms. Inside debt promotes managers' rational investment and makes up for the inefficiency of refinancing supervision.

Key words: inside debt, refinancing, debt overhang, agency conflict

CLC Number:

F830

Zhiming Zhao, Qiong Pan. The Impact of Debt-Based Incentives on Corporate Refinancing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(6): 27-36.

Figures/Tables 9

再融资前后	公司价值 $V b$	管理者价值 $M b$	股权价值 $E b$	初始总债务 $D b$
再融资后	484.07	9.68	393.32	90.75
再融资前	396.19	7.92	304.02	90.33

情形	参数	$X i$	$X d l$	$X d h$	$c n$	$C S n$	$V b$
FB	$φ$ =0.25	30.86	1.84	3.32	7.63	45.34	484.42
FB	$φ$ =0.35	31.17	1.85	3.33	7.66	47.49	483.72
SB	$φ$ =0.25	28.87	1.84	3.33	7.68	48.86	484.27
SB	$φ$ =0.35	29.11	1.84	3.34	7.72	51.32	483.56
FB	τ=0.2	30.67	1.84	3.32	7.64	45.75	510.64
FB	τ=0.3	31.40	1.85	3.32	7.66	47.01	457.52
SB	τ=0.2	28.78	1.84	3.33	7.69	49.14	510.47
SB	τ=0.3	29.22	1.84	3.34	7.71	51.00	457.38
FB	μ=0.008	31.53	1.92	3.46	7.71	50.66	457.52
FB	μ=0.012	30.51	1.76	3.18	7.59	42.31	513.47
SB	μ=0.008	29.40	1.92	3.48	7.77	54.77	457.35
SB	μ=0.012	28.59	1.76	3.19	7.64	45.57	513.33
FB	σ=0.2	26.15	2.20	3.79	7.38	27.13	481.14
FB	σ=0.3	36.45	1.56	2.93	7.97	69.49	487.74
SB	σ=0.2	24.91	2.20	3.80	7.41	29.18	481.03
SB	σ=0.3	33.51	1.56	2.95	8.05	74.96	487.55
FB	П=1.4	38.36	1.88	3.53	7.55	39.59	457.23
FB	П=1.6	26.08	1.81	3.14	7.74	52.50	514.54
SB	П=1.4	36.20	1.88	3.54	7.59	42.21	457.16
SB	П=1.6	24.17	1.81	3.15	7.80	57.30	514.27

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The Impact of Debt-Based Incentives on Corporate Refinancing

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