Abstract:

The development of a virtual power plant is vital for the demand response of power market and the accommodation integration of distributed energy into the power grid. It is also one of the critical approaches to using clean energy and achieving carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals. However， present power market pricing remains a crucial issue， particularly the green power-participated pricing problem in the power market. Several factors of bilateral users are considered in a virtual power platform based on the two-sided market theory： heterogeneity of demand price elasticity， the externality of the platform network， platform service quality， user behavior， and platform cost， etc.， and the pricing model of virtual power plant platform with different charging modes under monopolistic and competitive market structures are constructed， and then the numerical simulation is performed. The following are the outcomes： （1） Compared with the single registration fee system and transaction fee system under the market structure of platform monopoly， the two-part fee system with a high service level is a more favorable model for the long-term development of virtual power plants. Compared with the platform monopoly， the single ownership pricing of supply and demand users in the competitive market can make the virtual power plant more profitable. （2） In the case of a platform monopoly， the platform pricing under the three charging modes is related to the demand price elasticity of supply and demand users. And it is suppose the registration fee is greater than the marginal customer acquisition cost. In that case， the pricing under the two-part system is lower than the pricing under the transaction fee only. （3） Under the market structured of platform competition， the platform pricing for multi-homing power supply users is lower than for single-homing power demand users. With the enhancement of the cross-network externality on both sides of the power supply and demand， the platform's pricing for the demand users is increased. Still， the pricing for the supply users is different. And the strong cross-network externalities of the multi-homing power supply users will further expand the platform's pricing advantage. In contrast， the strong cross-network externalities of the demand users will reduce the disadvantage brought about by the platform's biased pricing. （4） For cross-network externalities with different intensities at both ends of supply and demand， with the improvement of platform service level， the profit of the virtual power plant platform increases first and then decreases， with a maximum value.

Key words: virtual power plant, bilateral market, platform pricing, charging mode, price elasticity