农地流转三方利益主体决策行为分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0833

Abstract

Abstract:

Since the central government proposed the motion of rural land transfer， the transfer of agricultural land has achieved remarkable results. However， there are still some areas where the transfer of agricultural land is in an inefficient， slow， and disorderly state. This is because there are different stakeholders in the process of farmland transfer， and whether their interest demands can be met affects the orderly transfer of farmland. Therefore， how to reasonably redistribute the interests of farmland transfer is the key to achieving the Pareto efficiency of the stakeholders.Since the interest demands of stakeholders are difficult to meet due to the imbalance in the redistribution of interests in the farmland transfer， the lack of effective pertinence of government policies has led to insufficient promotion results. As a result， the transfer of agricultural land lacks sufficient motivation， and stays an inefficient and slow situation in the long term. The SD（system dynamics） evolutionary game model of farmland transfer with the local government， the contractor， and the transferee as the tripartite players in the game is established. Based on the expected utility theory and Lyapunov's first law， the stability of the game players' strategies and the stability of the game system combination strategies are analyzed， respectively. Taking the national modern agricultural demonstration zone in Henan province as an example， the feedback regulation simulation analysis is carried out on the decision-making behavior of the tripartite game players. Data for the scenario simulations is mainly obtained from online consultation， Local Government Statistical Yearbook， Local Government Agricultural Survey Statistical Reports， Agricultural Price Survey Statistical Yearbook， Land Resource Network， China Agricultural Economic Information Network， and the academic literature. The results show that： The state of agricultural infrastructure and farmland transfer policies are the root causes of the different processes of farmland transfer in different regions， and the evolution track of game players is affected by the redistribution benefits of farmland transfer. However， ultimately the system evolves in an ideal equilibrium （promote， transfer-into， transfer-out）. The decision-making behavior of the contractor and the transferee plays a decisive role in the stability of the farmland transfer system， and the local government can effectively promote the process of farmland transfer by increasing transfer subsidies， providing technical support， and reducing transfer costs. In addition， increases in both wages from other jobs after transfer-out farmland and farmland rents are conducive to driving contractors toward the game strategy of transfer-out. For the transferee， the yield of farmland output is the main factor influencing its willingness to transfer-into. In the areas with high farmland output income， the government has little influence on the stability of the farmland transfer game system， while in the areas with low agricultural land output income， the transferee's willingness to transfer farmland is more sensitive to the government's promotion.Finally， according to the research conclusions， some management suggestions are giuen from the perspective of the government， which can provide theoretical and practical suggestions for promoting the orderly transfer of farmland and improving the agricultural modernization level in China.

Key words: farmland transfer, stakeholders, SD evolutionary game, decision-making behavior, simulation analysis

CLC Number:

F323.4

Rongjian Xie, Yucai Jia, Xiaoyue Mu, Feng Wang. Analysis of Decision-Making Behavior of Tripartite Stakeholders in the Farmland Transfer[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(11): 37-52.

Figures/Tables 17

		承包方
		流转(f)	不流转(1-f)
受让方	流转 (m)	$∑ i = 1 n P g s - C g s$	$∑ i = 1 n P f s - C g s 1 - ∑ i = 1 n Q θ$
		$∑ i = 1 n Q [μ m + C g s 2 + α i Y m - P l - C i + η]$	0
		$∑ i = 1 n [Q (μ f + P l - α i Y f + C i - θ) + P f i] - λ Q$	$∑ i = 1 n Q (α i Y f - C i + θ)$
	不流转 (1-m)	$∑ i = 1 n P f s - C g s 1 - ∑ i = 1 n Q θ$	$∑ i = 1 n P f s - C g s 1 - ∑ i = 1 n Q θ$
		0	0
		$∑ i = 1 n Q (α i Y f - C i + θ)$	$∑ i = 1 n Q (α i Y f - C i + θ)$

		承包方
		流转(f)	不流转(1-f)
受让方	流转 (m)	$∑ i = 1 n (P m s - Q μ m)$	$∑ i = 1 n P f s - ∑ i = 1 n Q θ$
		$∑ i = 1 n Q (μ m + α i Y m - C i - P l + η) - C m$	$- C m$
		$∑ i = 1 n [Q (P l - α i Y f + C i - θ) + P f i] - λ Q - C f$	$∑ i = 1 n Q (α i Y f - C i + θ)$
	不流转 (1-m)	$∑ i = 1 n P f s - ∑ i = 1 n Q θ$	$∑ i = 1 n P f s - ∑ i = 1 n Q θ$
		0	0
		$∑ i = 1 n Q (α i Y f - C i + θ) - C f$	$∑ i = 1 n Q (α i Y f - C i + θ)$

均衡点	特征值			正负符号	满足条件	稳定性
均衡点	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	正负符号	满足条件	稳定性
$E 1 (0,0, 0)$	$- C g s 1$	$- C m$	$- C f$	(-, -, -)	\\	ESS
$E 2 (1,0, 0)$	$C g s 1$	0	0	(+, 0, 0)	\\	不稳定点
$E 3 (0,1, 0)$	$- C g s 1$	$C m$	$- C f - 2 P f p + Q (n P l - λ) + ∑ i = 1 n P f i$	(-, +, N)	\\	不稳定点
$E 4 (0,0, 1)$	$- C g s 1$	$P m p - C m$	$C f$	(-, +, +)	\\	不稳定点
$E 5 (1,1, 0)$	$C g s 1$	0	$- 2 P f p + Q (n P l + n μ f - λ) + ∑ i = 1 n P f i$	(+, 0, N)	\\	不稳定点
$E 6 (1,0, 1)$	$C g s 1$	$n C g s 2 + P m p$	0	(+, +, 0)	\\	不稳定点
$E 7 (0,1, 1)$	$n [P g s - P m s + Q (μ m - C g s 2 - μ f)] - C g s 1$	$C m - P m p$	$C f + 2 P f p - Q (n P l - λ) - ∑ i = 1 n P f i$	(-, -, -)	①	ESS
$E 8 (1,1, 1)$	$C g s 1 - n [P g s - P m s + Q (μ m - C g s 2 - μ f)]$	$- n C g s 2 - P m p$	$2 P f p - Q (n P l + n μ f - λ) - ∑ i = 1 n P f i$	(-, -, -)	②	ESS

地区	$i$	$Q$	$α 1$	$C w 1$	$C r 1$	$θ$	$μ m$	$C g s 1$	$C g s 2$	$μ f$	$P g s$	$P m s$	$C m$	$P l$	$η$	$Y m$	$C f$	$P f i$	$Y f$	$λ$	a
固始县	3	500	1.25	570	800	210	100	5000	0	100	150000	150000	4000	500	225	1950	2000	2000000	1700	50	50
临颍县	3	500	1.25	570	710	215	100	1200	200	0	150000	150000	1000	700	225	2100	500	3810000	1800	50	50
新乡县	3	500	1.25	570	710	215	100	5000	0	160	150000	150000	4000	900	225	2400	2000	3740000	2100	50	50

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Analysis of Decision-Making Behavior of Tripartite Stakeholders in the Farmland Transfer

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