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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 325-334.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2446

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Nourish Your Competitor?——Demand Information Sharing of E-commerce Platform in the Presence of Store Brand Encroachment

Dongdong Yu1,2,Chunlin Luo1(),Miyu Wan3,Biao WANG1   

  1. 1.School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China
    2.School of Fan Li Business, Nanyang Institute of Technology, Nanyang 473000, China
    3.School of Transportation Engineering, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
  • Received:2021-11-26 Revised:2022-06-19 Online:2024-01-25 Published:2024-02-08
  • Contact: Chunlin Luo E-mail:chunlinluo@126.com

Abstract:

With the great success and huge data of e-commerce platforms, e-commerce platform giants such as Amazon, Kogan, JD, and T-mall aggressively expand their store brand (SB) business. The SB encroachment changes the interaction between the national brand (NB) suppliers and e-commerce platforms. The NB manufacturers not only sell NBs products on the platform but also compete with the platform. In other words, the SB encroachment transforms the relationship between the platform and manufacturer into a co-opetition relationship. The e-commerce platform faces a dilemma when deciding information sharing strategy. Hence, the issue of the market conditions under which the platform has an incentive to share information becomes more perplexing when considering the SB encroachment option.A game-theoretic model is developed to examine the interaction between demand information sharing and SB encroachment in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one e-commerce platform. The equilibrium results are solved by backward induction. Depending on whether the e-commerce platform shares information in stage 1, and whether the platform introduces an SB in stage 2, there are 4 subgames consisting of stage 3. These 4 subgames are analyzed, respectively, and then the equilibrium demand information sharing and SB introduction strategies are drived by comparing the e-commerce platform’s profits in these 4 subgames.The results show that demand information sharing has a double marginalization effect and brand competition effect under reselling mode, while revenue increasing effect and brand competition effect will be generated under agency selling mode. Demand information sharing strategies differ significantly under different sales modes. When the entry cost is very low or sufficiently high, the e-commerce platform prefers information sharing under agency selling mode, whereas the platform keeps demand information private under reselling mode. When the entry cost is intermediate and the product substitution coefficient is high, the e-commerce platform can promote store brand encroachment through a demand information sharing strategy.

Key words: e-commerce platform, store brand, demand information sharing, reselling mode, agency selling mode

CLC Number: