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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (12): 261-271.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2224

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Mutual Resistance or Mutual Forbearance? Study on Platforms Multimarket Competition Strategy

Zhi-wen LI1(),Bao-jiao WANG1,Yi LU1,Le Texier THOMAS2   

  1. 1.School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
    2.School of Economics, University of Rennes1, Rennes, 35065, France
  • Received:2022-07-13 Revised:2023-05-16 Online:2023-12-15 Published:2023-12-20
  • Contact: Zhi-wen LI E-mail:zhiwenli@ujs.edu.cn

Abstract:

Platforms cross-market operation has become more and more popular in recent years, and this puts the issue of platforms multimarket competition under the spotlight. Based on the Hotelling model, a multimarket competition system consisting of markets (a main market and a subsidiary market), platforms, sellers, and consumers, is buit and the competitive strategy selection of platforms among three options is analyzed: no multimarket competition in both the main and the subsidiary market, multimarket competition without exclusive contract, and multimarket competition with exclusive contract. The following findings are derived by the analysis. (1) Departing from the traditional multimarket competition theory, platforms multimarket competition does not necessarily lead to mutual forbearance between platforms. Specifically, mutual forbearance depends on whether platforms choose multimarket competition with exclusive contract or not. (2) The optimal multimarket competition strategy of the platforms is contingent on the cross-network externalities and the intrinsic benefit that platforms provide to users in the main market. (3) When platforms choose multimarket competition without exclusive contract, the user surplus and total social welfare are the highest. The user surplus and total social welfare are the lowest when platforms choose no multimarket competition.

Key words: two-sided markets, platforms multimarket competition, partial multi-homing, exclusive contract, anti-trust regulation

CLC Number: