Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (6): 22-33.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.2035
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SHI Qi1, SHEN Fang2
Received:
2019-12-19
Revised:
2020-06-28
Online:
2022-06-20
Published:
2022-06-24
Contact:
时奇
E-mail:qi.shi@foxmail.com
CLC Number:
SHI Qi, SHEN Fang. Debt-Bid Patent Auctions: Equilibrium Strategyand Expected Revenue[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(6): 22-33.
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