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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 244-255.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0678

• Articles • Previous Articles    

Moran Evolutionary Analysis of Enterprise’s Quality Improvement Investment Decision under Consumer Feedback

SUN Shu-hui1, ZHU Li-long2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 201800,China;2. School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014,China
  • Received:2019-05-12 Revised:2019-10-31 Published:2022-03-02
  • Contact: 朱立龙(1983-), 男(汉族), 山东日照人,山东师范大学商学院,教授、博士生导师, 同济大学管理科学与工程专业博士、山东大学工商管理专业博士后, 研究方向: 供应链管理与质量管理,Email:zhulilong2008@126.com. E-mail:zhulilong2008@126.com
  • Supported by:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BGL272,21ZDA024);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972146);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2019MG017)

Abstract: In recent years, with the development of social economy, people’s living standards and quality of life have gradually improved, and the quality requirements for products have become higher and higher. Therefore, when making a decision on quality improvement investment, the enterprise faces two choices: 1) choose to produce high-quality products to obtain quality advantages, or 2) choose not to make quality improvement investment to obtain low-cost advantages. Consumers will make different feedbacks on products of different quality, which will affect the profit of the enterprise, and then influence the fate of the enterprise. For the enterprises in different competitive environments, how to make product quality improvement investment decisions is very important.Based on the consumer feedback mechanism, consider the evolutionary trajectory of quality improvement investment strategies for N production companies that produce the same products. Each production company has two strategic options after weighing the value perception of consumer feedback and the cost of additional quality improvement (quality-advantage strategy or low-cost strategy). Based on the fixation probabilities of the Moran process, the probability of a successful intrusion of a quality-advantage strategy or a low-cost strategy in a limited production enterprise population is calculated. By comparing the fitness of the two strategies, and the individual fixation probability and the probability of neutral mutation, the conditions under which the strategy is dominant under strong and weak selections are obtained respectively. It is found: 1) When there are relatively few production enterprises, the quality-advantage strategy will occupy the entire group regardless of the cost of improving quality level as long as consumers have feedback on the quality level. 2) When the production enterprises' perception of consumer feedback is much higher than the cost of additional quality improvement, the quality advantage strategy is the winning strategy. 3) When the perceived effect of consumer feedback is slightly higher than the cost of additional quality improvement, under strong selection, the quality-advantage strategy is dominant, and under weak selection, the dominant strategy depends on the population size.4) The attention degree of enterprises towards consumer feedback depends on the market positioning of their products. Quality improvement policy advice and guidance for companies will be provided that aim to maintain or occupy different market shares.

Key words: consumer feedback; finite group; quality improvement investment; Moran process; evolutionary game

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