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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 88-96.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1830

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Farmers' Cooperative and Supply Chain Coordination under Platform Model——from the Perspective of Farmer Leading

HU Yu-feng1, DING Yong-qiang2, SUN Yuan-xin3   

  1. 1. School of Finance, Tongling University, Tongling 244061, China;
    2. School of Business Administration Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China;
    3. School of Public Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200434, China
  • Received:2018-12-25 Revised:2019-07-10 Online:2021-05-20 Published:2021-05-26

Abstract: The relationship of farmers and farmland has been weakened by the development of rural economy, the increase of non-farm income and the promotion of new rural construction, which not only promotes the transfer of farmland, but also provides a living space for the development of cooperatives. To build the development model of rural industry integration is an effective way to let farmers share the value added of the industry. Aiming at the problem of farmers' cooperative and supply chain coordination under the model of platform, a multistage Stackelberg Game model of farmer leading has been proposed under the background of farmland transfer, and a centralized decision-making model and four decentralized decision-making models have been designed. Risk transfer, decision priorities, marginal costs and risk costs are considered, profits maximization models of farmers, cooperatives, small farmers and platforms have been constructed, which were influenced by factors, such as the number of farmers (or the proportion of cooperation), the revenue of farmland transfer, the rate of increase in production, and the sales goals. The functions of optimal revenue of farmland transfer and maximum profits were obtained, and it was found that the number of farmers (or the proportion of cooperation), the revenue sharing rate, and the sales goals all had impacts on the optimal solution. Through numerical simulation, some conclusions are shown. Large farmer's(or cooperatives') priority can increase large farmer's(or cooperatives') profits; Under certain conditions, the cooperative model can achieve supply chain coordination; In the large farmer(or cooperative) model, platform and small farmers' profits are usually lower than those of other models; When the supply chain is coordinated and the profits of small farmers are not reduced, the platform's profits loss can be compensated through an effective way to ensure the continuous equilibrium of the cooperative model.

Key words: farmland transfer, cooperative, risk flow, supply chain coordination

CLC Number: