机构投资者持股压力下证券分析师乐观倾向研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.08.006

Abstract

Abstract: Optimism existing in stock recommendation is a prominent problem in present global security analyst industry. Based on the fraud triangle theory, the causes are analyzed theoretically from the viewpoints of pressure, chance and rationalized explanation in this research, and then empirical tests based on the 21054 collected recommendation samples issued by Chinese security analysts during 2010 to 2012 are carried out. Results show that the higher of institutional investors holding, the more likely analysts will release optimistic recommendations, and moreover, the higher probability of recommended stock reaching or exceeding their forecast. This research facilitates investors' scientific inspection to analysts' recommendations and provides a reference to regulatory authorities.

Key words: security analyst, stock recommendation, institutional investors, optimism

CLC Number:

F830

ZHU Wei-dong, WANG Li-na, SHEN Jie. Optimism in Security Analysts' Recommendations under Institutional Investors' Holding Pressure[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(8): 45-52.

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Optimism in Security Analysts' Recommendations under Institutional Investors' Holding Pressure

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