Abstract: The "Making in Own Factory by Others" type manufacturing outsourcing has become one of the important modes of manufacturers in practice. However, the problem of production quality is increasingly serious. In this paper, the controlling question of the violation behavior in manufacturing outsourcing is studied. The game method is used in this study. More deeply, three kinds of game models are discussed: violation and penalty, violation and inspect with penalty, violation and inspect with both penalty and bonus. This provides a new way of thinking for manufacturer who outsourcing its production to others to solving the quality control matter.The results of the study indicate that: (1) In addition to the effectiveness effect of penalty to violation in reducing the violation actions which has been proven by other researchers, we find that reward to the contractor who complies with the rules also can effectively reduce the violation behavior. Of course, both penalty and reward must be applied in certain conditions. If V-(1-a)(R+F+I)<0, then the contractor will select comply with rules, when both reward and penalty are used together. (2) Inspect can reduce the violation benefit of the contractor, but it can not reduce the possibility of violation behavior. So inspect is no notable effect on reducing violation behavior. (3) It has great effect on reduce the violation behavior if the outsourcer can raise the probability to find the violation behavior. According to the study results, the outsourcer can use three methods to control the manufacture quality: to use penalty and bonus together, or raise the probability to find the violation behavior, or reduce the violation benefit. Theoretical basis and practical guidance can be provided to the manufacture quality management of the enterprise who adopts "Making in Own Factory by Others" Type Manufacturing Outsourcing.

Key words: manufacture, "Making in own factory by others", type manufacturing outsourcing, quality control, game