Abstract: Through bringing fairness preference of principal and agent into multi-task principal-agent model, optimal incentive mechanism of SOEs'executives are studied based on fairness preference. The results show that in the aspect of production task, when multi-task cost function is independent and complementary or substitution is enough small, the fairness of SOEs'principal and agent would make optimal compensation back to fair level by the paths of both direct and indirect impact. And the indirect impact represents that fairness firstly impacts expect compensation by impacting optimal incentive intensity firstly. The fairness preference between principal and agent exists substitutive effect. In the aspect of social stability task, explicit incentive is not efficient way for this task, so government needs resort to implicit incentive. Besides, it can be found that the executive with higher education level has more strong fairness preference.

Key words: fairness preference, multi-task principal-agent, compensation incentive, SOEs