终极所有权结构对资本结构选择的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, the cross-section data of non-financial listed companies in China is adopted and a series of OLS is applied to empirically test the effect of ultimate ownership structure on the choice of capital structure. The result shows that ultimate ownership structure does affect the choice of capital structure. To be specific: (1)Cash flow rights is positively correlated with debt levels; (2)Control rights is negatively correlated with debt levels; (3)The degree of divergence between control rights and cash flow rights is negatively correlated with debt levels; (4) Firm with more control rights than cash flow rights maintains a significantly low debt levels; (5) Debt levels of the firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder is state-owned enterprise is significantly lower than that of firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder is non-state-owned enterprise like private company; (6) The more board members assigned by the ultimate controlling shareholder of the firm, the higher debt levels of the firm is. There is empirical evidence supporting the argument that in the case that control rights exceeds cash flow rights, the ultimate controlling shareholder is likely to tunnel listed companies through utilizing its control rights, therefore the effect of the preference for equity financing and reducing debt financing so as to shake off the constraints of tunneling behavior is significant.

Key words: ultimate ownership structure, cash flow rights, control rights, capital structure

CLC Number:

F275.1

Xiao Zuo-ping. The Effects of Ultimate Ownership Structure on the Choice of Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (4): 167-176.

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The Effects of Ultimate Ownership Structure on the Choice of Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

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