厂商产品线设计的委托代理分析

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LI Shan-liang, ZUO Min, ZHU Dao-li. The Analysis on the Principal-Agent Model of a Product Line Design[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (1): 117-121.

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The Analysis on the Principal-Agent Model of a Product Line Design

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