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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (5): 80-84.

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An Investigation of the Optimal Incentive Payment Scheme on Principal-Agent Relations between Owners and Managers ———Discussion of the Relationship between Industrial Types of an Enterprise and Output-Payment

GUO Bin1, ZHANG Shi-ying1, GUO Yan1,2, LENG Yong-gang 2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;
    2. Shandong Institute of Business and Technology, Yantai 264005, China
  • Received:2004-03-22 Revised:2004-08-10 Online:2004-10-28 Published:2012-03-07

Abstract: In order to solve the problem of managers’adverse selection and moral hazard brought by the principal-agent relationships of modern firms,owners should establish a set of optimal incentive payment schemes to ex-cite and restrict their behaviors,and hence managers can take effective action for owners in terms of their own benefits.The optimal incentive payment scheme contains five components:fixed-income,informational rent,risk compensation,incentive compensation and the managers’market price.The output-payment of manager is re-lated with the industrial types of an enterprise.

Key words: principal-agent, adverse selection, moral hazard, optimal incentive payment scheme, industrial types

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