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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2003, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 95-100.

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Absorptive Capacity and R&D Cooperation Innovates and Incentives and R&D Subsidy Policy

YANG Shi-hui1, XIONG Yan1, WANG Hong-ling2   

  1. 1. Institute of World Economic Research, Hubei University, Wuhan 430062, China;
    2. Industry Research Center of Economics, Hubei University, Wuhan 430062, China
  • Received:2002-01-10 Online:2003-02-28 Published:2012-03-06

Abstract: Base on the above research,a game model of having absorptive capacity non-cooperation R&D is setup,Comparing the R&D investment influence relatively with and without absorptive capacity,we find the enterprise R&D investment takes high with absorptive capacity,analyze the impact on industry and society optimum R&D investment level and subsidy incentive policy of choosing technological overflow in product’s substitute and complementary.

Key words: research joint ventures, absorptive capacity, cooperation game, non-cooperation game

CLC Number: