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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2008, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (5): 84-89.

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Consumer-Driving Safety Signaling of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Alliance

MENG Jiong1,2, TANG Xiao-wo1, NI De-bing1   

  1. 1. School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China;
    2. School of Economic Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China
  • Received:2008-03-03 Revised:2008-10-06 Online:2008-10-31 Published:2008-10-31

Abstract: From the perspective of the Corporate Social Responsibilities-the product safety,and its influence on the consumers,this paper applies the basic idea of game theory,investigates the principle of the signaling of manufacturer-retailer alliance under the supply chain's asymmetric safety information. then the results indicate:g manufacturer-retailer alliance adopt the positive safety signaling strategies,and they send out the signals which are not imitated by the b manufacturer-retailer alliance,the market will disassodate in a balanced and satisfactory. This method can make product difference on safety responsibility,and reinforce competitiveness of g product. The conclusion will provide important decision guidances to each member of the supply chain.

Key words: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance, safety responsibility, consumer’s preferences, signaling, game theory

CLC Number: