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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (1): 113-119.

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Multi-unit Multi-attribute Reverse Auctions with Variable Marginal Costs for Suppliers

YAO Sheng-bao   

  1. School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China
  • Received:2009-02-10 Revised:2010-01-05 Online:2010-02-28 Published:2010-02-28

Abstract: Multi-unit multi-attribute reverse auctions with variable marginal costs for suppliers are studied in this article.Firstly,an iterative auction mechanism is proposed according to the characteristic of variable marginal costs.Secondly,bidding strategies for the suppliers in the proposed mechanism are analyzed based on the assumption of the myopic best response strategies.Thirdly,the simulation experiments are conducted to study the effects of the valuation information,which is declared by the buyer on the auction.Results from numerical experiments show that,the mechanism achieves market efficiency in most instances.Compared to the auction mechanism in which the buyer's valuation information is not declared,the mechanism convergences fast but has lower market efficiency.

Key words: multi-attribute auction, marginal cost, bidding strategy, market efficiency, si mulation

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