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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (3): 326-338.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1461

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Incentive Contract of Renewable Energy Power Consumption in Energy Platform Supply Chain

Shuqin Xu, Qi Xu()   

  1. Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China
  • Received:2022-07-05 Revised:2022-12-20 Online:2025-03-25 Published:2025-04-07
  • Contact: Qi Xu E-mail:xuqi@dhu.edu.cn

Abstract:

The electricity sector is responsible for a major share of carbon dioxide emissions, to attach the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals, it is much significant to make renewable energy generation and consumption more effective and efficient. Currently, the consumption of clean electricity needs to be focused, on which there is much renewable power has been curtailed in China, a main reason being the imbalance of renewable power generation and consumption between the generators and electricity retailers. Meanwhile, there is a big gap in the government’s subsidy on renewable power generation, and the mechanism for market regulation performs insufficiently. As the regulations from the government in China, if generators trade renewable power or green certificates corresponding to renewable electricity in the electricity market or tradable green certificate market, the government needs not to offer subsidies to this part of the electricity generated from renewable sources, which is beneficial to alleviate the subsidy pressure of the government, as long as this part of renewable power or green certificates can be consumed in time by power retailers and power consumers. Moreover, if the renewable electricity quantity which the power retailer consumed, is more than the incentive consumption responsibility weight required, the power retailer can trade excess part, which is called excessive consumption in this paper, in the market.Firstly, the electricity market, tradable green certificate market, and carbon quota trading market are considered as an integrated energy trading platform, which couples carbon emissions with electricity, links generators and retailers. It is assumed that the energy platform supply chain in this paper, consists of a generator, an integrated platform, and a power retailer. Three scenarios are considered, including green electricity–green certificate separation, half-separation, and unity, to construct the optimal incentive contract of consumption for the platform. It is explored that the generator’s maximum effort to green power generation and the electricity retailer’s optimal effort to consume. Then, the optimal contract parameters in three scenarios are compared, with data from the electricity trading platform, green certificate trading platform, and carbon trading platform in China, it is investigated that the optimal prices of on-grid green power and tradable green certificate for renewable power being totally consumed. Also, it is analyzed the impacts of carbon emissions allowance, carbon price, and incentive consumption responsibility weight, on renewable power generation and consumption, and on the revenue of players in this platform supply chain. The results show that: (1) There is an equilibrium contract in various conditions, which incentivizes the generator and retailer to generate and consume green electricity as much as possible when their incentive levels got from the platform satisfy a certain constraint, and it is beneficial for the government to narrow the gap of subsidy when optimizing the prices of green electricity and thermoelectricity. (2) Under information asymmetry, the platform needs to pay extra information rents to induce the generator and power retailer to maximize efforts to generate and consume clean power, same as in information symmetry. (3) The price of the tradable green certificate can regulate the uptake of renewable electricity, and the totally consumption on this supply chain can be achieved when the price of the certificate attaches a certain threshold. (4) The generator’s fixed revenue, which got from the platform, is negatively affected by the carbon emissions quota delivered to it, while the fixed revenue of the electricity retailer is positively influenced by the incentive weight of renewable power consumption.With the incentive contracts of the energy trading platform, generators and power retailers can be incentivized to generate and consume more renewable power, which is beneficial to facilitate renewable power subsidies of the government faded out, carbon emissions reduced, and a clean transition of the power sector.

Key words: energy platform supply chain, weight of renewable energy consumption, effort to clean electricity generation, effort to the uptake of renewable power, tradable green certificate

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