Abstract: The securities analyst are in the interests chain of the securities market all the time, which makes the independence and objectivity of the research influenced by the behavior of conflict of interest. A total of 12 quarters of 8432 groups which come from the 1171 listed companies in the A-share market from January 1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2010 are chosed as the research sample based on the theoretical analysis of the relationship between conflicts of interest and analysts' follow-up behavior. By building the fixed-effect intercept model of panel data, the empirical study shows that: the higher the proportion of institutional investors holding, that is, the greater the pressure from the internal conflict of interest, the more the number of analysts' follow-up. What's more, the effect of executive ownership changes on analysts' follow-up behavior is not significant. This study not only enriches the theoretical research of the analysts' follow-up behavior, but also provides a new decision-making reference for the introduction of the related policies by regulatory authorities in order to promote the development of the analyst industry.

Key words: conflicts of interest, follow-up behavior of analysts, institutional ownership, the changes of executive ownership