双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

Abstract

Abstract: Considering the channel structure of a grid corporation and two power suppliers,stochastic differential game models of vertical cooperative mitigation are developed.The cooperation is heterogeneous and advantage-advantage,in which the power suppliers invest mitigation and the grid corporation invests utilization,and the feedback equilibria in the decentralized and integrated decision are investigated successively.Based on the comparison between the Stackelberg game and cooperative game,the share of the system's incremental profit under a profit-sharing contract is discussed.The results indicate that the grid corporation would selectively undertake a potion of power suppliers' mitigation expenses in decentralized decision.The equilibrium mitigation of power suppliers,purchase price and mitigation allowance of grid corporation are correlated to the mitigation competition coefficient.The cooperative game helps to raise purchase price in a certain condition and range,and brings about greater risk for the attempt.

Key words: electricity market, low-carbon energy utilization mechanism, cooperative mitigation, mitigation competition, stochastic differential game, feedback equilibrium

CLC Number:

TM73
F123.9

HUANG Shou-jun, REN Yu-long, SUN Rui, YU Ji-hui. Stochastic Differential Game Models of Vertical Cooperative Mitigation in Duopoly Electricity Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(2): 101-111.

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Stochastic Differential Game Models of Vertical Cooperative Mitigation in Duopoly Electricity Market

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