考虑广告主信誉的付费搜索拍卖机制研究——均衡、收益与效率分析

Abstract

Abstract: Profit-driven of keyword auction mechanism induces huge amounts of network fraud information, which greatly damages the interests of users.Through analyzing the optimum equilibrium bidding strategies and comparing with GSP auction mechanism which is widely used, found the ranking rule considering reputation is more conducive than the simple rule of competitive ranking to improve advertising auction's profit and efficiency, when the difference between credibility of advertisers is large. Further, through analyzing the quilibrium realization path and numerical simulation, the conclusion is also verified under a dynamic circumstance.

Key words: sponsored search auction, GSP mechanism, VCG equilibrium, advertiser reputation, auction efficiency

CLC Number:

F224.33

YIN Hong. Research on the Mechanism of Sponsored Search Auction with Advertiser Reputation——Equilibrium, Revenue and Efficiency Analysis[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(11): 54-61.

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Research on the Mechanism of Sponsored Search Auction with Advertiser Reputation——Equilibrium, Revenue and Efficiency Analysis

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