工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper,one owner and many contractors construction system is studied, in which the owner uses menu contract, including unit price contract and revenue sharing contract, to stimulate contractors on project quality optimization and coordination. Two basic models are built up, one is single-stage incentive model and the other is multi-stage incentive model as contractors having fairness perceptions.Performance and evolution under different compensation structures are also analyzed by computational experiment. Results show that: Any compensation structure can not maintain it's efficiency when it is executed in multi-stage incentives; Compensation structure performing well in single-stage model can not keep good performance when applied to multi-stage incentive process; Individual fairness perception has negative influence on incentive performance; Every motivational factor in compensation structure has impact on incentive efficiency, and perfect incentive effect can not be achieved if cooperation among all incentive factors are ignored.

Key words: quality optimization, mass stimulation, compensation structure, computational experiment

CLC Number:

F830

LI Zhen, MENG Qing-Feng, SHENG Zhao-han, LI Qian. Analysis on Performance and Evolution of Mass Stimulation under Project Quality Optimization[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (3): 112-121.

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Analysis on Performance and Evolution of Mass Stimulation under Project Quality Optimization

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