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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 117-122.

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Study on Risk Sharing Contract Design of Retailer-Leading Supply Chain with Downside-Risk Control

CHEN Ju-hong1, ZHANG Ya-qi1, SHI Cheng-dong1,2   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, China;
    2. School of Electric and Electronic Engineering, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255091, China
  • Received:2010-05-31 Revised:2011-10-18 Online:2012-02-29 Published:2012-03-09

Abstract: Under the downside-risk control, the revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain which formed by the retailers and the downside-risk-averse manufacturers. And on the basis of revenue sharing contract, risk sharing contract is designed, which ensure the profits of supply chain participants are given to improve and realize Prateo improvement with the downside-risk control. Finally the effectiveness of risk sharing contract is verified by numerical analysis, and find the greater the manufacturer's risk aversion (downside risk) in a certain range, the greater the additional profits of supply chain participants access with implementing risk sharing contract.

Key words: downside-risk, supply chain, risk sharing, coordination

CLC Number: