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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (1): 42-49.

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Delayed Dynamic Bidding Model and Its Complexity in Oligopoly Power Market

ZHANG Xin-hua1,2, LAI Ming-yong2, YE Ze1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410076;
    2. School of Economy and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha 410079, China
  • Received:2008-07-02 Revised:2009-01-10 Online:2009-02-28 Published:2009-02-28

Abstract: In the paper, with bounded rational and adaptive dynamics, the delayed dy nam ic bidding model is presented based on Cournot game, and the stable region, bifurcation and stranger attractor of the Nashe-quilibrium are displayed respectively by numerical simulations, then the impact of delayed fact or and different bidding dynamics on average payment of generators are analyzed.Inaddition, chaos control of delayed dynamic bidding model is discussed with state delayed feedback control method, and numerical simulations indicated that, 1) delayed factor is useful to maintain the stability of Nash equilibrium, but it is not certain to improve the payment of generators; 2) the maximal average payment is attained to generators in equilibrium state, and the optimal adjustment strategy of dynamics is to use adaptive dynamics before equilibrium, but bounded rational dynamics once loss of equilibrium; 3) Nash equilibrium of dylayed dynamic modle enables to be maint ainable if suitable control parameter is chosen, but it is diffcult to myopic generator.

Key words: cournot game, delayed dynamics, chaos control, bidding strategy, power market

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