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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2008, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (6): 184-192.

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Innovation Subsidies or Product Subsidies:the Government Strategy Choice of Technical Alliance

SHENG Yan-chao1,2   

  1. 1. Economic Research Center, Hunan Unversity, Changsha 410079, China;
    2. Dept of Travelling Management, Hunan Business College, Changsha 410205, China
  • Received:2008-05-23 Revised:2008-12-04 Online:2008-12-31 Published:2008-08-20

Abstract: As an effective way of technological innovation,the technical alliance attaches great importance. the dispute of the subsidy way and the existence of the spillover effects lead to that the state must judge the subsidies means to the technical alliance. The article constructs a three-game model on the subsidies of the R&D input and the innovative products. The results show that:the innovation input will increase with the increase of spillover effect,under the incentive of the intellectual property rights the enterprise innovation input and the spillover effect will reach the virtuous cycle;When government intervenes the technical alliance,the product subsidies is a more effective manner than the R&D input subsidies. It is very importaut to encourage government increasing the innovation incentive and choosing the innovation subsidies method.

Key words: technology alliance, input subsidy, products subsidy, policy arrangement

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