经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究

Abstract

Abstract: There exist agent costs because of different targets between shareholders and managers.Managers own private information on investment due to information asymmetry.Managers will over-invest in the specific investment for purpose of entrenchment to realize control benefits,which damages the benefit of shareholders.In this paper we build a simple contract model between shareholders and managers.Shareholders offer part of shares to the managers for effective incentives.After obtaining the perfect share ratio to managers,we discuss the comparative static analysis on perfect share ratio and over-investment when risk attitude of managers,investment risk and ability gap between current managers and alternative managers happen to change.

Key words: over-investment, principal-agent relationship, incentives

CLC Number:

F830.2

WANG Yan, SUN Pei-yuan, YANG Zhong-zhi. Manager’s Over-Investment and Stock Incentives:A Contract Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (1): 127-131.

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Manager’s Over-Investment and Stock Incentives:A Contract Model

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