Abstract: The development of the remanufacturing industry has garnered growing attention from both enterprises and governments. However, consumer skepticism towards remanufactured products often results in significant price discounts at the point of sale, adversely impacting corporate profitability. To address these constraints, certain well-funded original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have initiated targeted marketing campaigns to enhance consumer acceptance. For instance, Converse has implemented a series of promotional activities—including sustainability advocacy, emotional innovation initiatives, co-branded collaborations, and social media campaigns—for its remanufactured “Renew ”footwear line. Similarly, IKEA has executed marketing programs to promote its remanufactured home products. These efforts have substantially elevated consumer recognition of the aforementioned remanufactured goods and boosted corporate profits. Nevertheless, independent remanufacturers (IRs), typically constrained by limited capital, lack the financial foundation for marketing investment. Consequently, they remain entrenched in a vicious cycle of 'low recognition → low profitability → low marketing expenditure.' This challenge is particularly acute when IRs are the primary source of remanufactured products, as low recognition and insufficient marketing collectively hinder the advancement of the entire remanufacturing sector. Thus, government subsidies become critical. Motivated by this perspective, this study establishes a stylized game-theoretic model involving the government, the IR, and the OEM, explicitly incorporating the impact of IRs' marketing input on remanufactured product acceptance. The model examines the effects of three government policies—no subsidy, subsidies to the IR, and subsidies to consumers—on marketing expenditure levels, remanufactured product pricing, and optimal subsidy selection within an IR-OEM competitive framework. Key findings reveal that marketing investment levels influence the supply-demand equilibrium of remanufactured products while being constrained by factors such as remanufacturing production costs and marketing expenditures. Government subsidies do not reduce barriers to entry into remanufacturing but can enhance post-entry marketing efforts and profitability for firms. Notably, subsidies may alter firms' profit logic and foster subsidy dependency. By introducing dynamic analysis of effective prices and changes in total remanufacturing costs, this study dissects the transmission effect of subsidy utility across the supply chain. Key conclusions include consumer surplus exhibiting higher sensitivity to total cost changes than IR (Investment Return) benefits.  Counterintuitively, under certain conditions, both remanufactured product prices and optimal subsidy amounts may decrease as total remanufacturing costs increase. Furthermore, consumer subsidies exhibit broader applicability compared to subsidies directed at remanufacturers.

Key words: marketing input level, remanufacturer decsion-making, production subsidy, consumer subsidy.