Abstract:

With the development of a new generation of information technology， the third-party shared manufacturing platforms have developed rapidly and gradually become an important procurement channel for manufacturing enterprises. Productive service providers on the platform can attract manufacturers to purchase productive services by disclosing quality information reflecting their service quality. However， quality information disclosure will incur some costs. Therefore， productive service providers need to weigh the benefits and corresponding costs of quality information disclosure. In addition， productive service providers that offer alternative services on the platform compete with each other， which makes the revenue brought by quality information disclosure uncertain， and further affects the commission revenue of the platform. The quality information disclosure is conducive to increasing the platform's trading volume and commission revenue. Therefore， the platform needs to design an effective information disclosure incentive mechanism to improve the information disclosure level of service providers.Motivated by the above practice， it focuses on a supply chain composed of a third-party shared manufacturing platform， two competing productive service providers， and multiple manufacturers who purchase the productive service. By building a dynamic game model， the service providers' quality information disclosure decision is analyzed and the effects of competition intensity and the proportion of information-sensitive manufacturers on the information disclosure level are explored. On this basis， the optimal decision of the supply chain system is investigated and the feasible range of information disclosure incentive is obtained by taking the supply chain system as the comparison benchmark. Through examining the changes of information disclosure level in the feasible range， four quality disclosure incentive situations are obtained and the two-part incentive contract is designed to improve the quality information disclosure level of service providers. Finally， some numerical examples are constructed through MATLAB software to explain the results intuitively.The result indicates that competition between service providers will have a positive impact on the information disclosure level only when the proportion of information-sensitive manufacturers is large， the service price is within a range and the degree of competition is lower than a threshold value. Otherwise， intensifying competition will lower the information disclosure level. Compared with the optimal decision-making of the supply chain system， the service providers may have an excessively high level of information disclosure under certain conditions to maintain a competitive advantage. When the information disclosure level of the service provider is lower than the optimal level of the supply chain system， the two-part contract adopted by the platform can encourage competing service providers to improve the quality information disclosure level， which realizes the win-win goal of supply chain members. Under the two-part incentive contract， the platform may provide fixed compensation to the service providers， or ask the service provider for fixed compensation such as registration fee and membership fee.

Key words: shared manufacturing, the third-party platform, supply chain, quality information disclosure, incentive mechanism